Northern Illinois University

Huskie Commons
Graduate Research Theses & Dissertations

Graduate Research & Artistry

2015

Panic and implicit theories
Lindsay Mae Miller

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/allgraduate-thesesdissertations

Recommended Citation
Miller, Lindsay Mae, "Panic and implicit theories" (2015). Graduate Research Theses & Dissertations.
4252.
https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/allgraduate-thesesdissertations/4252

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Research & Artistry at Huskie
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Research Theses & Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Huskie Commons. For more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

ABSTRACT
PANIC AND IMPLICIT THEORIES
Lindsay Mae Miller, M.A.
Department of Psychology
Northern Illinois University, 2015
David Valentiner, Director

This thesis examines the roles of anxiety sensitivity, related constructs, and implicit theories
constructs in uniquely predicting state anxiety in response to an interoceptive challenge.
Because anxiety sensitivity appears to be a target of treatment for panic, it is important to
understand anxiety sensitivity and related constructs (distress tolerance, intolerance of
uncertainty, experiential avoidance, and discomfort intolerance). Implicit theories constructs
were also examined (implicit theories of emotion, implicit theories of physiological arousal, and
implicit theories of sensation transience). It was hypothesized that anxiety sensitivity and related
constructs would mediate the relationship between implicit theories constructs and state anxiety.
Participants completed measures of anxiety sensitivity, related constructs, and implicit theories
constructs before an overbreathing task. Only distress tolerance uniquely predicted anxiety. All
implicit theories variables uniquely predicted discomfort intolerance. No implicit theories
variables uniquely predicted anxiety. No mediation analyses were conducted. Limitations and
implications are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Panic attacks (PAs) are periods of extreme fear (American Psychiatric Association
[APA], 2013). It is estimated that PAs are experienced by at least one in four people throughout
the lifetime (Kessler et al., 2006). A diagnosis of panic disorder (PD) is appropriate when the
individual experiences multiple unexpected PAs and is concerned about them (APA, 2013).
Both individuals who experience PAs but do not meet criteria for PD and individuals who do
meet criteria for PD experience functional impairment (Klerman et al., 1991). Cognitivebehavioral therapy (CBT) for PD is effective and decreases anxiety sensitivity (AS; see Clark,
1999; Hazen, Walker, & Eldridge, 1996; Smits et al., 2008). Given that AS is the apparent target
of an effective treatment for CBT (e.g., Smits et al., 2008), it is important to understand AS. To
further examine this construct and related constructs, a sample of undergraduate psychology
students will be asked to complete measures of these constructs and an interoceptive task.
To gain a better understanding of AS, research examining constructs studied in
conjunction with AS will be reviewed. First, PAs, PD, and CBT for PD will be discussed. Then
theory and research on AS will be briefly summarized. This review will include a summary of
the evidence that AS is related to pathological outcomes. Constructs potentially related to AS
will then be discussed. These constructs include distress tolerance, intolerance of uncertainty,
experiential avoidance, and discomfort intolerance. Additional constructs drawing from research
on implicit self theories will also be included. These constructs are implicit theories of emotion,
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implicit theories of physiological arousal, and implicit theories of sensation transience. The
implicit theories of emotion construct has been previously researched. Both the implicit theories
of physiological arousal and the implicit theories of sensation transience constructs are proposed
for the present study. Given the large quantity of potentially related constructs, it is crucial to
determine if they are incrementally useful or redundant in understanding panic. The purpose of
this selective review is to better understand the nomological net surrounding AS in preparation
for a proposal of a study to clarify which constructs might be most useful in understanding panic.

Panic

Panic Attacks
A panic attack “is an abrupt surge of intense fear or intense discomfort that reaches a
peak within minutes, and during which time … physical and cognitive symptoms occur” (APA,
2013, p. 209). These symptoms include pounding or accelerated heart rate, trembling or shaking,
sensations of shortness of breath or smothering, feeling faint, and fear of dying (APA, 2013).
Although there are criteria for PAs in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-5), PAs are not a codable disorder because they can occur in the context of a variety of
disorders and, although impairing, are not always debilitating (APA, 2013). Thus, one cannot be
diagnosed with PAs; rather, it is a required criterion for PD (APA, 2013). PAs are quite
common; although estimates may vary, one estimate of lifetime prevalence for meeting criteria
for a PA is 28.3% (Kessler et al., 2006).
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Panic Disorder

Panic disorder is characterized by recurrent, unexpected PAs and at least one month of
concern or worry about potential additional attacks or the consequences of past attacks or
changes in behavior due to the attacks (APA, 2013). To meet criteria for PD, the PAs must be
“out of the blue” (APA, 2013, p. 209). This requirement is included because PAs may occur in
response to certain stimuli, such as a spider or a crowd, and could be attributed to another mental
disorder, such as specific phobia or social phobia (APA, 2013).
Although estimates may vary, one estimate of lifetime prevalence rate of PD is
approximately 4.7% (Kessler et al., 2006). The persistence of PD is relatively high; 57.4% of
individuals with PD continue to meet criteria over a 12-month period (Kessler et al., 2006). The
average age of onset for PD is 23.6 years (Kessler et al., 2006). PD is also associated with
significant impairment. Those with PD have high rates of comorbidity with other mental
disorders such as major depressive disorder (32.3%), alcohol abuse (26.4%), social anxiety
disorder (19%), specific phobia (18%), drug abuse (17.7%), generalized anxiety disorder (16%),
and obsessive-compulsive disorder (7%; Francis et al., 2007; Klerman et al., 1991). One study
found that 77.6% of PD patients concurrently have another psychological disorder (lifetime,
98%; Tilli, Suominen, & Karlsson, 2012). Compared to individuals with PAs (who do not meet
criteria for PD), those with PD experience more impairment and report worse physical and
mental health. Further, those with PD, in comparison to those with PAs only, seek more
treatment for emotional and physical problems, are more financially dependent, and are less
likely to be looking for work because their mental health problems prevent it (Klerman et al.,
1991).
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Agoraphobia

Agoraphobia (AG) is characterized by marked anxiety about being in a place or situation
from which escape would be difficult or in which help may be unavailable in the event that the
individual were to experience panic-like or other incapacitating or embarrassing symptoms
(APA, 2013). Prior to the publication of the DSM-5, AG was yoked to panic. In the previous
edition (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000), a diagnosis of PD specified whether the individual met
criteria for AG and a diagnosis of AG may only be made without a diagnosis of PD. Although
AG is a codable disorder, many individuals experience AG in conjunction with PAs and PD. In
one study looking at the epidemiology of PAs and PD with and without AG, researchers
categorized individuals who had experienced any PAs into PA only, PA-AG, PD-AG, and PD
only groups (Kessler et al., 2006). The lifetime prevalence of PD-AG is approximately 1.1%,
and roughly 1 in 5 individuals with PD also meet criteria for AG (Kessler et al., 2006). The age
of onset for AG with PAs and with PD is 19.3 years and 17.0 years, respectively (Kessler et al.,
2006). This age of onset is comparable to the age of onset for PAs and for PD. Although PDAG is less common than PD alone, it is related to more impairment. Specifically, individuals
with PD-AG are likely to seek treatment and to be diagnosed with another mental disorder
compared to PD alone (Francis et al., 2007). Francis and colleagues (2007) followed individuals
over a three-year period in which the participants may have chosen to receive treatment or not,
and they found that those with PD-AG are less likely to recover from their symptoms
(probability of recovery = 0.22) than those with PD alone (probability = 0.75).
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Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Panic Disorder

CBT is recommended as the first line of treatment for PD and PD-AG (APA, 2009;
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2011; National Institute of Mental Health,
1990; The Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists, 2005; The Royal
Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists, 2009). According to Clark (1999), “the
treatment that was developed first, and therefore has been most extensively evaluated, is
cognitive therapy for panic disorder” (p. S20). This treatment includes behavioral experiments,
or exposures, throughout therapy (Clark, 1999). At the end of treatment, 74-94% of individuals
are “panic free” (Clark, 1999, p. S20); these results exceed those from no treatment, supportive
psychotherapy, applied relaxation, and psychopharmacological treatment (see Clark, 1999).
Because AS is a key construct in understanding panic and in the present study, it is necessary to
understand how AS changes following this effective treatment for PD.

Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and Anxiety Sensitivity
AS is defined as one’s concern or fear of anxiety-related arousal due to the real or
imagined consequences of this arousal, such as having a heart attack or going crazy (Reiss &
McNally, 1985). An important aspect of CBT approaches that use interoceptive exposure (i.e.,
exposing clients to their own body sensations) is that clients are taught that anxiety and its
accompanying sensations are not dangerous (e.g., cognitive therapy, Clark, 1999). Therefore,
CBT appears to target AS, and change in AS appears to mediate the change in panic symptoms;
that is, when clients participate in CBT, their reported levels of AS decrease (Hazen, Walker, &
Eldridge, 1996; Smits et al., 2008; Smits, Porter, Chiu, & Young, 2004; Smits, Powers, Cho, &
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Telch, 2004). Given that AS appears to be the targeted mechanism used to facilitate change in
panic symptoms, it is important to gain an improved understanding of the nomological net
surrounding AS. This is the purpose of the present study.

Anxiety Sensitivity and Related Constructs

Theory and Research on Anxiety Sensitivity
AS is viewed as a trait variable related to “concern about the real or imagined
consequences of anxiety” (Reiss & McNally, 1985, p. 107). For example, an individual with
high AS will likely misinterpret a racing heart as indicative of an impending cardiac event or
racing thoughts as indicative of insanity, rather than simply benign, anxiety-related sensations.
AS is considered an “anxiety amplifier;” when people with high AS experience anxiety, they
tend to become concerned about their anxiety-driven sensations, which exacerbates their anxiety
(Taylor et al., 2007). Research has identified three components of AS: cognitive (e.g., “when
my thoughts seem to speed up, I worry that I am going crazy”), physical (e.g. “when I notice my
heart skipping a beat, I worry that there is something seriously wrong with me”), and social
concerns (e.g., “when I tremble in the presence of others, I worry what people might think of
me;”Taylor et al., 2007). Researchers have looked at AS using a variety of methods including
comparing mean levels across diagnostic groups, asking participants to complete interoceptive
challenge tasks in the laboratory, following participants prospectively, and looking at changes in
AS that occur during treatment.
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Diagnostic Groups

To better understand how AS and its specific concerns (i.e., total AS and AS component
scales) vary between individuals with different disorders, researchers have compared mean AS
levels associated with different diagnostic categories. Previous studies have sought to determine
the relationship between components of AS and various diagnostic groups. In a recent study
using the updated version of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI-3, a measure commonly used to
quantify AS), researchers examined the total AS and each of three components of AS—physical
concerns, cognitive concerns, and social concerns—and how they related to specific anxiety
disorders (Taylor et al., 2007). Researchers recruited a diverse sample of participants from the
United States, Canada, France, Mexico, Spain, and the Netherlands, including a control sample
and those with a primary diagnosis (based on severity) of an anxiety disorder (Taylor et al.,
2007). All diagnoses were made using a clinical interview (Taylor et al., 2007). Across multiple
countries, those with a diagnosis of PD experienced the highest amount of physical concerns (M
= 11.3, SD = 6.7), followed by those with obsessive-compulsive disorder (M = 8.3, SD = 6.2) or
generalized anxiety disorder (M = 8.1, SD = 5.3), followed by those with social anxiety disorder
(M = 6.2, SD = 4.5), followed by nonclinical individuals (M = 2.7 – 5.5, SD = 3.2 -4.8; Taylor et
al., 2007). Individuals with PD (M = 9.0, SD = 6.4) or generalized anxiety disorder (M = 8.9, SD
= 7.4) experience the highest amount of cognitive concerns, followed by those with obsessivecompulsive disorder (M = 7.7, SD = 6.0) and social anxiety disorder (M = 7.9, SD = 6.1),
followed by nonclinical individuals (M = 1.7 – 3.5, SD = 2.8 – 4.1; Taylor et al., 2007).
Individuals with social anxiety disorder experience the highest amount of social concerns (M =
17.3, SD = 4.8), followed by those with PD (M = 12.3, SD = 5.8), followed by those with
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obsessive-compulsive disorder (M = 10.3, SD = 6.7) or generalized anxiety disorder (M = 10.5,
SD = 7.0), followed by nonclinical individuals (M = 5.9 – 8.5, SD = 4.0 – 4.8; Taylor et al.,
2007). Other researchers have found similar results (see Kemper, Lutz, Bähr, Rüddel, & Hock,
2012; Rector, Szacun-Shimizu, & Leybman, 2007; Taylor et al., 1996). AS and its components
appear to be important variables to consider when examining a variety of dimensions of anxiety
psychopathology. However, this may be especially true for PD, as PD is the most, or second
most, commonly noted disorder linked to high levels of AS (for a review, see Naragon-Gainey;
2010; Olatunji & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2009).

Interoceptive Challenge Studies

When proposing the cognitive model of panic and discussing AS, Clark (1986) asserted
that PAs occur when experiencing anxiety-related physiological arousal only if these sensations
are interpreted as dangerous. Given that AS is marked by concern about the consequences of
anxiety, it is not surprising that researchers have investigated the relationship between AS and
PAs by inducing anxiety-related physiological arousal sensations in the laboratory (for a review,
see McNally, 2002). Individuals with high levels of AS report experiencing more physiological
sensations when completing an overbreathing challenge (e.g., hyperventilation) compared to
individuals with low levels of AS (Holloway & McNally, 1987). Individuals with high levels of
AS are also more likely to interpret the resulting sensations as dangerous and experience more
state anxiety when completing an interoceptive challenge (e.g., overbreathing/hyperventilation,
CO2 challenge, Cholecystokinin-Tetrapeptide [CCK-4], sodium bicarbonate infusion, sodium
lactate infusion; Eser et al., 2004; Holloway & McNally, 1987; Gorman et al., 1989; Koszycki,
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Cox, & Bradwejn, 1993; McNally & Eke, 1996; Schmidt, Trakowski, & Staab, 1997; Zwanzger
& Rupprecht, 2005). In addition, AS is significantly associated with panic responses during an
interoceptive challenge (Schmidt et al., 1997). More specifically, the physical concerns
component seems to be a strong predictor of response to an interoceptive challenge (Brown,
Smits, Powers, Telch, 2003).

Prospective Studies

Other researchers have used AS to prospectively predict which individuals will experience a PA
(for a review, see McNally, 2002). In one pair of studies, researchers evaluated Air Force cadets
during the first and last week of basic training (Schmidt, Lerew, & Jackson, 1997; Schmidt,
Lerew, & Jackson, 1999). The cadets who reported higher levels of AS were more likely to
experience one or more PAs compared to those who reported lower levels of AS (Schmidt et al.,
1997; Schmidt et al., 1999). Those who experienced one or more PAs also reported greater
impairment, more anxiety symptoms, more depression symptoms, and more hopelessness
(Schmidt et al., 1997; Schmidt et al., 1999). It was also found that a history of PAs was
associated with greater likelihood of experiencing another PA (Schmidt et al., 1997; Schmidt et
al., 1999). Each of the three components of AS (physical concerns, cognitive concerns, and
social concerns) significantly predicted experiencing a PA over the period of observation
(Schmidt et al., 1999). In addition, only cognitive concerns significantly predicted future PAs
when controlling for trait anxiety and previous history of PAs (Schmidt et al., 1999). Other
researchers have also found that high levels of AS predict future PAs (see Ehlers, 1995; Li &
Zinbarg, 2007; Maller & Reiss, 1992; Schmidt, Zvolensky, & Maner, 2006).
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Summary

Research has been conducted to understand AS and its components. By comparing
different diagnostic groups, researchers have found that individuals with an anxiety disorder
diagnosis report higher levels of AS than a nonclinical sample. In addition, those with a
diagnosis of PD report relatively high levels of AS physical concerns. Individuals who report
high levels of AS also tend to experience more physical sensations and state anxiety when
participating in an interoceptive challenge. Further, when following a sample over time, the
participants who report higher levels of AS are more likely to experience a PA than those who
report lower levels. Finally, AS is related to the maintenance of PD, as those with high levels of
AS are more likely to have their PD symptoms persist than those with low AS (Hazen, Walker,
& Eldridge, 1996). In sum, AS appears to be a key construct in understanding PAs and PD.
However, AS is likely not the only construct that may be helpful in understanding panic.

Distress Tolerance
Distress tolerance is defined as “the capacity to experience and withstand negative
psychological states” (Simons & Gaher, 2005, p. 83). These negative states may be of cognitive
or physical origin. Distress is considered an emotional state and distress tolerance a metacognitive construct that includes an individual’s evaluations and expectations regarding how well
he/she handles emotional distress (Simons & Gaher, 2005). The arousal-related sensations
associated with anxiety are the focus of AS, but they may also be related to distress tolerance.
Both the sensations and resulting cognitions about potential negative consequences can cause
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distress. It is possible that distress tolerance, which encompasses multiple areas of distress, may
also encompass AS.
The relationship between distress tolerance and panic/AS has been primarily conducted
in the context of individuals who smoke and smoking cessation (e.g., Keough, Riccardi,
Timpano, Mitchell, & Schmidt, 2010; Zvolensky, Feldner, Eifert, & Brown, 2001; Zvolensky et
al., 2009). One such study examined daily smokers who reported relatively low levels of
nicotine dependence and moderate alcohol use problems (Marshall et al., 2008). Reported
distress tolerance was significantly negatively related to meeting criteria for a PA (self-report of
four or more PA symptoms and “sensation of panic”) following an interoceptive challenge
(hyperventilation; r = -.25, p < .05; Marshall et al., 2008). Those who reported a greater ability
to tolerate distress were less likely to experience the symptoms of a PA and an accompanying
sense of panic (Marshall et al., 2008).
Research has yet to explicitly focus on the relationship between distress tolerance and
AS. To consider this possible relationship, one may look at a study in which university students
were asked to complete a variety of self-report measures, including measures of distress
tolerance, AS, and symptoms of anxiety disorders (Keough, Riccardi, Timpano, Mitchell, &
Schmidt, 2010). Distress tolerance was significantly negatively associated with anxiety
symptoms, including a measure of panic (r = -.32, p < .001) and AS (r = -.47, p < .001; Keough
et al., 2010). Expectedly, AS and panic were significantly related (r = .31, p < .001; Keough et
al., 2010)1. In other words, those who report a greater ability to tolerate distress also tended to

1

Incremental validity of distress tolerance is -.17, incremental validity of AS is .17.
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report experiencing fewer anxiety symptoms and lower AS. These findings have yet to be
replicated and may be insignificant when other constructs are considered.

Intolerance of Uncertainty

Intolerance of uncertainty is conceptualized as cognitive, emotional, and behavioral
reactions to uncertainty (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). High levels
of intolerance of uncertainty are believed to make it difficult for individuals to process
ambiguous information and make decisions (Freeston et al., 1994). This difficulty may arise
because those with greater intolerance of uncertainty hold high requirements for evidence
because of uncertainty (Freeston et al., 1994). Individuals with high levels of intolerance of
uncertainty frequently find themselves asking “what if?” (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012).
Empirically, researchers have used statistical methods to split intolerance of uncertainty into two
components—prospective anxiety and inhibitory anxiety (Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson,
2007). Prospective anxiety is related to uncertainty about the future, and inhibitory anxiety is
related to uncertainty in the moment (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012). The two factors are highly
intercorrelated and are often conceptualized as one (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012). Although the
construct was originally developed to better understand generalized anxiety disorder (Freeston et
al., 1994), it has also been studied in relation to AS and panic.
To look at the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and panic, researchers
examined a treatment-seeking sample of individuals with anxiety or mood disorders (52% met
criteria for PD; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012). Symptom measures of PD were significantly
correlated with both factors of intolerance of uncertainty, prospective anxiety and inhibitory

13
anxiety (r = .37, p < .001; r = .39, p < .001; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012). Greater panic
symptoms were generally reported by individuals who also reported greater intolerance of
uncertainty.
Previous research has also been conducted on the relationship between intolerance of
uncertainty and AS. For example, one study, using a sample of undergraduate students, found
that AS is significantly correlated with the combination of both factors of intolerance of
uncertainty, prospective anxiety (r = .49, p < .01) and inhibitory anxiety (r = .62, p < .01), and
with the factors combined to form a total intolerance of uncertainty score (r = .58, p < .01;
Carleton, Sharpe, & Asmundson, 2007). These authors theorized that the relationship between
intolerance of uncertainty and AS may be due to one’s intolerance of uncertainty about anxietyrelated physiological arousal sensations, which is often held by individuals with PD (Carleton et
al., 2007). The incremental validity of intolerance of uncertainty when predicting AS does not
appear to have been examined, including in relation to other constructs.

Experiential Avoidance
Experiential avoidance is defined as “the phenomenon that occurs when a person is
unwilling to remain in contact with particular private experiences (e.g., bodily sensations,
emotions, thoughts, memories, behavioral predispositions) and takes steps to alter the form or
frequency of these events and the contexts that occasion them” (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette,
& Strosahl, 1996, p. 1154). Because a PA is, by its very definition, terrifying and
uncomfortable, it is likely an experience in which one would not choose to remain. Individuals
with high AS, the tendency to be concerned about the consequences of anxiety (which are often
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imagined to be dangerous), likely have frightening thoughts that a person would be unwilling to
experience. Because a person likely tries to not have these thoughts, it is feasible that panic is
related to experiential avoidance and that AS may lead an individual to actively avoid anxietyinvoking experiences.
In one study, researchers asked patients with a diagnosed anxiety disorder in an intensive
outpatient program to complete a measure of experiential avoidance (Acceptance and Fusion
Questionnaire – Youth [AFQ-Y], Greco, Lambert, & Baer, 2008), a measure of AS, and
symptom measures, including panic (Fergus et al., 2010). They found a significant relationship
between experiential avoidance and panic symptoms (r = .45, p < .01) and between experiential
avoidance and AS (r = .46, p < .01; Fergus et al., 2010). As expected, AS and panic symptoms
were also significantly correlated (r = .51, p < .01; Fergus et al., 2010)2. The strong relationship
between experiential avoidance, AS, and panic symptoms indicate that two or more of these
constructs may not be distinct.
Other research has explored the relationship between AS and experiential avoidance. For
example, in one study researchers recruited undergraduate students who completed self-report
measures and found that AS and experiential avoidance were significantly related (r = .37, p <
.01; Study 1, Kashdan et al., 2006). In this study, researchers used the Acceptance and Action
Questionnaire, and higher scores on the measure of experiential avoidance was indicative of
more psychopathology, and therefore, individuals who scored higher on the measure of
experiential avoidance also reported more AS (Kashdan et al., 2006).

2

Incremental validity of experiential avoidance is .34, incremental validity of AS is .26.
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In another study, patients with an anxiety disorder were recruited to complete self-report
measures and assessment data (Berman, Wheaton, McGrath, & Abramowitz, 2010). Like the
previous study, experiential avoidance was significantly associated with AS (r = -.48, p < .01;
Berman et al., 2010). In this study, researchers used the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire –
II, and recoded the data so that higher scores on the measure of experiential avoidance was
indicative of less psychopathology, so individuals who scored higher on the measure of
experiential avoidance also reported less AS (Berman et al., 2010). The relationship between AS
and experiential avoidance has been found in both nonclinical and anxiety-specific clinical
populations. With this information, it is likely that these two constructs are related and, more
importantly, that their contributions to predicting panic are not completely redundant. However,
this relationship has yet to be examined in the context of other related variables.

Discomfort Intolerance
Discomfort intolerance is defined as one’s ability to tolerate pain or discomfort (Schmidt
& Cook, 1999). When compared to normal controls, patients with a diagnosis of PD have higher
baseline levels of discomfort intolerance and AS (Schmidt & Cook, 1999). In addition to having
a lower capacity to tolerate discomfort, they may also experience more actual discomfort than
others, as those individuals who have a high intolerance for discomfort likely also experience an
inability to manage uncomfortable sensations (Schmidt, Richey, & Fitzpatrick, 2006) .
Individuals with this discomfort intolerance believe statements such as “I can[not] tolerate a
great deal of physical discomfort” (Schmidt et al., 2006). Although AS appears to be linked to
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the “intense fear” component of a PA, discomfort intolerance would appear to be the counterpart
linked to “intense … discomfort” (APA, 2013, p. 214).
Researchers have conducted investigations to understand the link between discomfort
intolerance and panic. In one study, nonclinical participants completed self-report measures and
an interoceptive challenge (CO2 challenge; Schmidt, Richey, Cromer, & Buckner, 2007).
Although AS did significantly predict physical symptoms, state anxiety, and anxiety-related
cognitions, discomfort intolerance and AS each predicted unique variance in state anxiety (for
discomfort intolerance, β = .39, p = .008; for AS, β = .34, p = .03), and discomfort intolerance
predicted unique variance in anxiety-related cognitions beyond that predicted by AS (β = .34, p =
.02; Schmidt et al., 2007). There was also an AS by discomfort intolerance interaction when
predicting panic (ΔR2 = .47, p = .01). For those with low anxiety sensitivity, subjective
reactivity(SUDS ratings) to the interoceptive challenge was unrelated to discomfort intolerance
(Schmidt et al., 2007). Those with high AS and high discomfort intolerance reported the highest
reactivity to the interoceptive challenge (Schmidt et al., 2007). In a different study, researchers
found that AS and discomfort intolerance were uncorrelated and appeared to distinct factors
(Bernstein et al., 2009). Discomfort intolerance seems to be an independent construct and may
be separate from AS, though also related to panic. It is possible that discomfort intolerance and
AS may be subsumed under negative affect.

Statement of the Problem, Part 1

A great deal of research has been conducted on PD and its treatment (e.g., Clark, 1999;
Kessler et al., 2006), and CBT with interoceptive exposure has been widely accepted as the first
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line of treatment for PD (e.g., APA, 2009). AS appears to be a key construct in conceptualizing
PD and its treatment (e.g., Smits et al., 2008). However, it is possible that AS is not the only
construct that should be considered in the course of this treatment.
In addition to being a useful construct when considering the treatment of PD, AS has also
proven to be valuable when thinking about other aspects of PAs and PD. AS and its components
have been shown to have a distinct pattern among diagnostic groups; total AS and AS physical
concerns are especially elevated among individuals with PD (e.g., Taylor et al., 2007). In
laboratory studies, AS predicts which participants are more likely to have a panic attack while
completing an interoceptive challenge (e.g., overbreathing/hyperventilation, CholecystokininTetrapeptide [CCK-4]; e.g., Eser et al., 2005; Schmidt et al., 1997). In prospective studies, it
also predicts which individuals are more likely to have a panic attack over the period of
observation (e.g., Schmidt et al., 1997; Schmidt et al., 1999).
Other individual difference variables have been theorized to be related to AS. Because of
these potential relationships, it is possible that these variables may also be related to panic.
These constructs include distress tolerance, intolerance of uncertainty, experiential avoidance,
and discomfort intolerance. These variables have, to varying degrees, been researched
independently of, and in conjunction with, AS. Given their relationship to AS and the
relationship between AS and panic, it is possible that these constructs may be related to panic
(see Figure 1). However, further information is needed to understand the relationship between
these variables and panic. It is important to know if these constructs are incrementally useful in
understanding panic or if they are redundant. In addition to the previously explored constructs,
another group of constructs (implicit theories constructs) may also be relevant to panic.
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Figure 1. Proposed model. (Residuals, correlations among residuals, and correlations among
exogenous variables not shown. Strength of predicted pathways represented by path thickness.)
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Implicit Theories Constructs

Implicit Theories

Implicit self-theories are beliefs that a quality of the self or others is either fixed or
malleable. Broadly, there are two types of implicit self-theories: entity (fixed) and incremental
(malleable). Those who hold an entity view consider their abilities and characteristics, and those
of others, to be fixed and tend to give up in response to a challenge (Dweck & Leggett, 1988).
Those who hold an incremental view consider themselves and their abilities, as well as those of
others, to be malleable and tend to view challenges as an opportunity (Dweck & Leggett, 1988).
It is important to note that an individual’s implicit self-theory (entity or incremental) in one
domain may not generalize to other domains; in other words, if an individual maintains an entity
theory in one domain (e.g., intelligence), it does not mean that he or she holds an entity theory in
all domains (e.g., peer relationships; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995).
Entity self-theories have generally been thought of as maladaptive in terms of responses
to challenges and pursuing goals, while incremental self-theories are considered adaptive.
Individuals with an entity theory display helplessness and limit their capacity to respond
effectively when faced with challenges (Dweck, 1986). Individuals with an incremental theory
are able to learn and change in order to maximize their achievements (Dweck & Leggett, 1988).
This level of adaptiveness is determined by the goals an individual chooses and the
individual’s response to challenges. Performance goals, which are generally characteristic of
entity theorists, aim to demonstrate competency and to receive positive evaluations from others
(Dweck, 1986). Entity theorists view success and failure as indicative of the self and choose less
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difficult performance goals to ensure that they are able to prove their abilities (Dweck & Leggett,
1988). With learning goals, which are generally held by incremental theorists, the aim is not to
appear knowledgeable or capable, but rather to become more knowledgeable and capable
(Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Rather than trying to prove themselves, like those who hold an entity
theory, incremental theorists seek to improve themselves and their abilities; potential failure is
part of the process and not threatening (Dweck & Leggett, 1988).
The self-theory an individual holds also influences how he or she responds to a challenge.
Entity theorists tend to respond with a helpless behavior pattern; they avoid challenges and do
not persist when faced with difficult tasks (Dweck, 1986). Incremental theorists respond with a
mastery-oriented pattern of behavior; these individuals seek out challenges and demonstrate high
persistence when they encounter difficulty (Dweck, 1986).
Implicit theories have been applied to domains such as intelligence and academic
achievement (Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002; Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; Elliott
& Dweck, 1988; Rattan, Good, & Dweck, 2012), personality and victimization (Yeager,
Trzesniewski, Tirri, Nokelainen, & Dweck, 2011; Yeager et al., 2011; Yeager, Miu, Powers, &
Dweck, 2013; Yeager, Spitzer, Trzesniewski, Johnson, & Dweck, in submission; Yeager,
Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2013), peer relationships and victimization (Rudolph, 2010), shyness
and social anxiety (Beer, 2002; , Valentiner, Jencius, Jarek, Gier-Lonsway, & McGrath, 2013;
Valentiner, Mounts, Durik, & Gier-Lonsway, 2011), morality (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997),
and weight management (Burnette, 2010). For the present study, three implicit theories (two of
which are being proposed) may aid in the understanding of panic.
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Implicit Theories of Emotion

Researchers have noted that individuals experience negative affect differently (Koole,
2009). To better understand why these differences occur, the construct of implicit theories of
emotion was developed (Tamir, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2007). Implicit theories of emotion
are the beliefs that one holds about his or her emotions and are related to the ways in which he or
she regulates these emotions (Tamir et al., 2007). These beliefs include whether one believes
that his or her emotions can change and whether one’s emotions are under one’s control (Tamir
et al., 2007) This construct focuses on emotional experience rather than emotional expression
(Tamir et al., 2007).
Entity theorists view their emotions as being fixed, as something that must be allowed to
run its course because, once begun, they cannot be changed (Kappes, & Schikowski, 2013).
They also may view negative emotions as threatening or dangerous because they may lead to
additional negative affective experiences that would be beyond their control (Kappes, &
Schikowski, 2013). Compared to incremental theorists, entity theorists believe that they are
unable to modify their emotions (Tamir et al., 2007). Because of this belief, they are less likely
than incremental theorists to use anticipatory strategies of emotion regulation such as cognitive
reappraisal (Tamir et al., 2007). They also tend to avoid situations that may evoke negative
affect whereas incremental theorists may approach them as a learning experience (Kappes, &
Schikowski, 2013). Incremental theorists tend to view emotions as malleable, as something that
can be changed or managed (Kappes, & Schikowski, 2013). These individuals may not
negatively evaluate their unpleasant emotions; rather, they are curious to learn more about these
emotions, which may lead to a better understanding of how to change or manage them in the
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future (Kappes, & Schikowski, 2013). One’s implicit theory of emotion is hypothesized to
influence which emotion regulation strategies an individual employs (Tamir et al., 2007).
Although there is limited research on implicit theories of emotion, the findings support
the construct as currently conceptualized. In one study, incoming college freshman were
assessed at three points throughout their first academic year—the summer before the school year,
during the fall semester, and at the end of the spring semester (Tamir et al., 2007). Using the
data collected during the summer before the school year, researchers found that students with
more of an incremental theory, compared to students with more of an entity theory, were more
likely to use cognitive reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy and have higher levels of
emotion regulation self-efficacy (Tamir et al., 2007). In addition, an entity view of emotions is
significantly related to more intense emotional experiences (Tamir et al., 2007). Looking at the
weekly diaries kept throughout the fall semester, incremental theorists (as determined during the
summer before the school year) reported more positive and less negative emotional experiences
than entity theorists (Tamir et al., 2007). When assessed at the end of the spring semester,
incremental theorists (as determined from data collected during the summer before the school
year) once again reported more positive and less negative emotional experiences than entity
theorists (Tamir et al., 2007). An incremental theory in the summer before the school year was
also significantly correlated with higher well-being, lower levels of depressive symptoms,
greater social adjustment, and less loneliness at the end of the spring semester (Tamir et al.,
2007).
In another study, female college students watched a distressing scene from a movie
(Kappes, & Schikowski, 2013). After watching this movie, participants were asked to choose to
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watch the clip again, this time with the ending, or to watch an uplifting movie clip of the same
length as the other clip (Kappes, & Schikowski, 2013). Implicit theories of emotion were not
related to negative affect before viewing the first movie clip but were related after viewing the
clip such that entity theory strength positively predicted more negative emotions while watching
the clip (r = .31, p = .005; Kappes, & Schikowski, 2013). The stronger the entity belief that
participants reported, the more feelings of discomfort they reported while watching the movie
and the more they avoided the negative stimuli during the movie, even after controlling for the
intensity of negative emotions experienced (Kappes, & Schikowski, 2013). In addition, the
strength of one’s entity belief was marginally correlated with choosing to watch the positive
movie clip rather than the aversive movie clip (r(82) = .21, p = .057; Kappes, & Schikowski,
2013). The research on implicit theories of emotions supports the current conceptualization of
the construct. Individuals regulate their emotions differently depending on what they believe
about their emotions, and these differences influence well-being, experiences of negative affect,
and avoidance behaviors.
PAs are, by definition, associated with fear, a negative emotion (APA, 2013). It is
reasonable to hypothesize that implicit theories of emotion are related to the way in which an
individual experiences a PA or the sensations that trigger a PA. Believing that the fear cannot be
altered or controlled and that it cannot be stopped once it has begun likely shapes how an entity
theorist responds to a PA or its sensations. In addition, believing that this fear is dangerous
could also be related to an entity theorist’s experience of a PA and its accompanying sensations.
In contrast, viewing this fear as malleable and as a potential learning experience may lead
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incremental theorists to experience a PA, or the sensations of a PA, differently than entity
theorists.
Implicit theories of emotion is distinct from AS. In the context of PAs, implicit theories
of emotion are concerned with fear, the hallmark emotion of PAs, and its malleability or
fixedness. Believing that fear can or cannot change does not appear to be equivalent to believing
that the sensations themselves are dangerous. Implicit theories of emotion are concerned with
the emotion; AS, with the sensations.

Implicit Theories of Physiological Arousal, A Proposed Construct

Implicit theories of physiological arousal is a construct proposed for the present study as
a counterpart to implicit theories of emotions. It is hypothesized that implicit theories of
physiological arousal are beliefs that individuals hold about their own physical state. Entity
theorists view their physiological arousal as being fixed, as something that must be allowed to
run its course because, once begun, it cannot be altered. They also likely view the sensations of
physiological arousal as threatening or dangerous because they may lead to additional negative
physical experiences or sensations that would be beyond their control and have negative
consequences. When compared to incremental theorists, entity theorists believe that they are
unable to modify their physiological sensations. Because of these beliefs, entity theorists tend to
avoid situations that may evoke physiological arousal and its accompanying sensations whereas
incremental theorists may approach them as a learning experience. In contrast, incremental
theorists tend to view physiological arousal as malleable, as something that can be changed or
controlled. These individuals do not necessarily evaluate their unpleasant physical sensations as
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negative or dangerous; rather, they are curious to learn more about these sensations, which may
lead to a better understanding of how to change or manage them. It is theorized that when an
entity theorist experiences a PA, he or she will view the sensations as dangerous and
uncontrollable; an incremental theorist will view the sensations as modifiable and possibly as a
learning experience.
This construct is also distinct from AS. In the context of PAs, implicit theories of
physiological arousal should be concerned with the existence and duration of the physiological
sensations, a key to the experience of PAs, and their malleability or fixedness. Believing that
one’s physiological sensations can or cannot change theoretically does not appear to be
equivalent to believing that the sensations themselves are dangerous. However, believing that
one’s sensations cannot change is likely evaluating them as concerning and potentially
dangerous. Implicit theories of physiological arousal are concerned with the duration and
stability of anxiety-related arousal sensations; AS, with the consequences of these sensations.

Implicit Theories of Sensation Transience, A Proposed Construct

Implicit theories of sensation transience is a construct proposed for the present study and
influenced by work on implicit theories of emotional transience (Labroo & Mukhopadhyay,
2009). Implicit theories of emotional transience is conceptualized as the extent to which an
individual believes that his or her emotions are fleeting or permanent. It is hypothesized that
implicit theories of sensation transience are beliefs that individuals hold about the fleetingness of
their own physical sensations. Entity theorists view their sensations as being fixed, as something
that is permanent. They also likely view their sensations as threatening or dangerous because
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they may lead to additional negative physical experiences or sensations that would last for an
interminable period and have negative consequences. When compared to incremental theorists,
entity theorists believe that they are unable to modify the duration of their sensations. Because
of these beliefs, entity theorists tend to avoid situations that may evoke frightening sensations
whereas incremental theorists may not be bothered by them because he knows that they will soon
pass. In contrast, incremental theorists tend to view sensations as malleable, as something that is
fleeting and whose duration can be altered. These individuals do not necessarily evaluate their
sensations as negative or dangerous; rather, they view them as transitory with no permanent
consequences, which may allow them to better change or manage the sensations. It is theorized
that when an entity theorist experiences a PA, he or she will view the sensations as permanent,
and thus more dangerous; an incremental theorist will view the sensations as transient and
fleeting.
This construct is also distinct from AS. In the context of PAs, implicit theories of
sensation transience should be concerned with the temporal duration of the sensations. Believing
that one’s sensations are permanent or fleeting does not appear to be equivalent to believing that
the sensations themselves are dangerous. However, believing that one’s sensations are
permanent likely leads evaluating them as concerning and potentially dangerous. Implicit
theories of sensation transience are concerned with the temporal duration of anxiety-related
arousal sensations; AS, with the consequences of these sensations.
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Statement of the Problem, Part 2

One potential approach to understanding AS and panic is through the application of
implicit theories. Implicit theories constructs have proven useful in other areas of research (e.g.,
academic achievement and intelligence, shyness and social anxiety; Elliot & Dweck, 1988;
Valentiner et al., 2011). One potentially relevant implicit theories construct, implicit theories of
emotion (e.g., Tamir et al., 2011), has not yet been applied to panic. In addition, implicit
theories of physiological arousal and implicit theories of sensation transience are constructs
proposed for the present study as novel applications of implicit theories. The purpose of the
proposed project is to examine whether these implicit theories constructs predict panic symptoms
and whether their influence is mediated by AS and related constructs (distress tolerance,
intolerance of uncertainty, experiential avoidance, and discomfort intolerance; see Figure 1).

Hypotheses
To test the above mediation, the conditions of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) approach
informed the hypotheses. This approach was chosen over another option (e.g., Preacher and
Hayes, 2004) because the purpose of these hypotheses is to test for mediation, not indirect
effects.

Hypothesis 1

AS physical concerns (Hypothesis 1.1), AS cognitive concerns (Hypothesis 1.2), AS
social concerns (Hypothesis 1.3), distress tolerance (Hypothesis 1.4), intolerance of uncertainty
(Hypothesis 1.5), experiential avoidance (Hypothesis 1.6), and discomfort intolerance
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(Hypothesis 1.7) will predict panic symptoms. Based on previous findings, AS physical
concerns, AS cognitive concerns, and AS social concerns are expected to be particularly strong
predictors.

Hypothesis 2
Following Baron and Kenny’s (1986) conditions for mediation, the first condition is to
test the relationship between the independent variable and the mediator. It is hypothesized that
implicit theories of emotion will predict AS physical concerns (Hypothesis 2.1), AS cognitive
concerns (Hypothesis 2.2), AS social concerns (Hypothesis 2.3), distress tolerance (Hypothesis
2.4), intolerance of uncertainty (Hypothesis 2.5), experiential avoidance (Hypothesis 2.6), and
discomfort intolerance (Hypothesis 2.7). Implicit theories of emotion are expected to be an
especially strong predictor of AS cognitive concerns, distress tolerance, and distress intolerance.
Similar analyses will be conducted for implicit theories of physiological arousal (Hypotheses 2.8
through 2.14) and implicit theories of sensation transience (Hypotheses 2.15 through 2.21).
Implicit theories of physiological arousal are expected to be an especially strong predictor of AS
physical concerns and intolerance of uncertainty. Implicit theories of sensation transience is
expected to be an especially strong predictor of intolerance of uncertainty.

Hypothesis 3

The second condition of mediation is to test the relationship between the independent
variables and the outcome variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). It is hypothesized that implicit
theories of emotion (Hypothesis 3.1), implicit theories of physiological arousal (Hypothesis 3.2),
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and implicit theories of sensation transience (Hypothesis 3.3) will predict panic symptoms.
Implicit theories of physiological arousal (an entity theory) is expected to be a particularly strong
predictor of panic symptoms.

Hypothesis 4
Following Baron and Kenny’s (1986) conditions for mediation, the third condition is to
test the relationship between the mediators and the outcome variables. This was test was
examined in Hypothesis 1. Once all three conditions have been met, one can test the relationship
between the independent variables and the outcome variables when controlling for the mediators
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). It is hypothesized that, when controlling for AS physical concerns,
implicit theories of emotion (an entity theory; Hypothesis 4.1), implicit theories of physiological
arousal (an entity theory; Hypothesis 4.2), and implicit theories of sensation transience (an entity
theory; Hypothesis 4.3) will no longer predict panic symptoms or its predictive power will be
reduced. Similar analyses will be conducted when controlling for AS cognitive concerns
(Hypotheses 4.4 through 4.6), AS social concerns (Hypothesis 4.7 through 4.9), distress
tolerance (Hypotheses 4.10 through 4.12), intolerance of uncertainty (Hypotheses 4.13 through
4.15), experiential avoidance (Hypotheses 4.16 through 4.18), and discomfort intolerance
(Hypotheses 4.19 through 4.21). Experiential avoidance is especially expected to mediate the
relationship between implicit theories of emotion and panic symptoms, AS physical concerns is
especially expected to mediate the relationship between implicit theories of physiological arousal
and panic symptoms, and intolerance of uncertainty is especially expected to mediate the
relationship between implicit theories of sensation transience and panic symptoms.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD

Participants

Using the guideline of 10 cases per variable in a regression analysis, it was determined
that a minimum of 80 participants were required to test the hypotheses. Participants (N = 82;
Mage = 19.61, SD = 3.42) were introductory psychology students recruited from the SONA
website. The majority of participants were male (54.9%), White (56.1%, 32.9% Black, 13.4%
other race; participants chose one or more races), and not Hispanic (87.8%). Nearly all
participants reported that they had never been diagnosed with a mental disorder (95.1%), and no
participants reported a previous diagnosis of panic disorder or any other anxiety disorder. All
participants received two SONA credits in return for their participation.

Materials

Measures
Anxiety Sensitivity Index – 3 (ASI-3; Taylor et al., 2007)

The ASI-3 is a commonly used measure that was designed to measure AS and consists of
18 items measured on a five-point scale (0 = very little, 1 = a little, 2 = some, 3 = much, 4 = very
much; Taylor et al., 2007). The ASI-3 consists of three components, each with six items. These
components are physical concerns (e.g., “when my stomach is upset, I worry that I might be
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seriously ill” and “when I notice my heart skipping a beat, I worry that there is something
seriously wrong with me”), cognitive concerns (e.g., “when my thoughts seem to speed up, I
worry that I might be going crazy” and “when my mind goes blank, I worry that there is
something terribly wrong with me”), and social concerns (e.g., “I worry that other people will
notice my anxiety” and “when I tremble in the presence of others, I fear what people might think
of me”). The ASI-3 has good internal (αs = .78 - .83), convergent (rs = .93 - .99 when compared
with previous measures of AS), and discriminant (ps for planned contrasts of scales < .001)
validities for the component scores (Taylor et al., 2007). The ASI-3 total and component scores
are calculated by adding all responses; a higher score is indicative of greater anxiety sensitivity.
The component scores were used for all analyses. In the present sample, the ASI-3 component
scales showed good to excellent internal reliability (ASI-3 physical concerns α = .618, ASI-3
cognitive concerns α = .848, ASI-3 social concerns = .775).

Distress Tolerance Scale (DTS; Simons & Gaher, 2005)

The DTS is a commonly used measure of distress tolerance and consists of 15 items
measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree). The DTS consists
of four components, each with three to six items. These components are tolerance (e.g., “feeling
distressed or upset is unbearable to me”), appraisal (e.g., “I can tolerate being distressed or upset
as well as most people”), absorption (e.g., “when I feel distressed or upset, all I can think about
is how bad I feel”), and regulation (e.g., “I’ll do anything to avoid feeling distressed or upset”).
The DTS total scale and component scales have good internal reliability (α = ,89; Simons &
Gaher, 2005). The DTS total and component scores are calculated by taking the mean scores of

32
the items (component scores) or scales (total; item 6 is reverse coded). Higher scores represent
higher levels of distress tolerance. In the present sample, the DTS total score showed excellent
internal reliability (α = .939).

Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Buher & Dugas, 2002)

The IUS is a commonly used measure of intolerance of uncertainty and consists of 27
items measured on a five-point scale (1 = not at all characteristic of me to 5 = extremely
characteristic of me). All items load on one scale (e.g., “uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious,
or stressed”). The IUS has excellent internal consistency (α = .95), and it is a valid construct
(Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Buhr & Dugas, 2006). The IUS score is calculated by summing the
responses to all items. Higher scores indicate higher levels of intolerance of uncertainty. In the
present sample, the IUS showed excellent internal reliability (α = .956).
Acceptance and Fusion Questionnaire – Youth (AFQ-Y; Greco, Lambert, & Baer, 2008)

The AFQ-Y is a commonly used measure of cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance
and consists of 17 items measured on a 5-point scale (0 = not at all true to 4 = very true).
Although the AFQ-Y was originally developed to have two components, statistical analyses have
found that all items load onto one factor (e.g., “my life won’t be good until I feel happy” and “I
must get rid of my worries and fears so I can have a good life;” Greco et al., 2008; Fergus et al.,
2011). When the two components are combined to create one score, the AFQ-Y has good
internal consistency (α = .90 - .93) and good convergent validity (correlation with a measure of
panic symptoms r = .45, p < .01; Fergus et al., 2011). The AFQ-Y total scores are calculated by
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summing the responses to all items. Higher scores are indicative of greater cognitive fusion and
experiential avoidance. In the present sample, the AFQ-Y showed excellent internal reliability
(α = .912).

Discomfort Intolerance Scale (DIS; Schmidt et al., 2006)

The DIS is a commonly used measure of discomfort intolerance and consists of five items
measured on a seven-point scale (0 = not like me at all to 6 = extremely like me). It consists of
two components, each with two to three items. The components are discomfort avoidance (e.g.,
“I can tolerate a great deal of physical discomfort” and “I have a high pain threshold”) and
discomfort intolerance (e.g., “I take extreme measures to avoid feeling physically
uncomfortable,” “when I begin to feel physically uncomfortable, I quickly take steps to relieve
the discomfort,” and “I am more sensitive to feeling discomfort compared to most people”). The
total score has acceptable internal reliability (α = .60; Schmidt et al., 2006). The DIS total and
component scores are calculated by summing the responses to the respective items after reversescoring the items in the discomfort avoidance scale. Because both component scales correlate
highly with the total score (discomfort avoidance r = .88, discomfort intolerance r = .77), the
total score was used in the present analyses (Schmidt et al., 2006). Higher scores represent
greater levels of discomfort intolerance. In the present sample, the DIS total scale showed good
internal reliability (α = .650).
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Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale (ITES; Tamir et al., 2007)

The ITES is a measure of implicit theories of emotion and consists of four items
measured on a six-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree). Half of the items
measure an incremental theory (“everyone can learn to control their emotions” and “if they want
to, people can change the emotions that they have”), and half of the items measure an entity
theory (“no matter how hard they try, people can’t really change the emotions that they have”
and “the truth is, people have very little control over their emotions”) and are reverse-scored.
The ITES has acceptable internal consistency (α = .75; Tamir et al., 2007) and has been used
with college students (Tamir et al., 2007; Kappes & Schikowski, 2013). The ITES score is
determined by calculating the mean of all responses after reverse-scoring the two aforementioned
items. Higher scores indicate a stronger incremental theory. In the present sample, the ITES
showed excellent internal reliability (α = .775).

Implicit Theories of Physiological Arousal Scale (ITPAS)

The ITPAS is a measure of implicit theories of physiological arousal and consists of four
items measured on a six-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree). It was adapted
from Tamir and colleagues’ (2007) ITES for the purpose of the present study. Half of the items
measure an incremental theory (“everyone can learn to control their physical sensations” and “if
they want to, people can change the physical sensations that they have”), and half of the items
measure an entity theory (“no matter how hard they try, people can’t really change the physical
sensations that they have” and “the truth is, people have very little control over their physical
sensations”) and are reverse-scored. The ITPAS score is determined by calculating the mean of
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all responses after reverse-scoring the two aforementioned items. Higher scores indicate a
stronger incremental theory. In the present sample, the ITPAS showed excellent internal
reliability (α = .831).

Implicit Theories of Sensation Transience Scale (ITSTS)

The ITSTS is a measure of implicit theories of emotional transience and consists of
implicit theories of sensation transience and consists of four items measured on a six-point scale
(1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree). It was adapted from Tamir and colleagues’ (2007)
ITES for the purpose of the present study. Half of the items measure an incremental theory
(“everyone can learn that their sensations are fleeting” and “if they want to, people can change
the duration of their sensations”), and half of the items measure an entity theory (“no matter how
hard they try, people can’t really change the duration of their sensations that they have” and “the
truth is, people have very little control over the duration of their sensations”) and are reversescored. The ITSTS score is determined by calculating the mean of all responses after reversescoring the two aforementioned items. Higher scores indicate a stronger incremental theory. In
the present sample, the ITSTS showed good internal reliability (α = .696).

Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Kaplan, Smith, & Coons, 1995)

The SUDS is a commonly used measure of state distress and will be used in the proposed
study to measure state anxiety (Kaplan et al., 1995). A SUDS rating will be taken multiple times
throughout the interoceptive challenge and will be rated on a 10-point scale (0 = no anxiety to 10
= extremely intense anxiety). The SUDS index has good validity and has been validated with
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college student samples (Kaplan et al., 1995). SUDS scores will be analyzed using the mean of
all trials, and higher scores represent greater state anxiety. In the present sample, the SUDS
showed excellent internal reliability (α = .941).

Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988)

The PANAS is a commonly used measure of positive and negative affect and consists of
20 items rated on a 5-point scale (1 = Very Slightly or Not at All to 5 = Extremely). It consists of
two components, each with ten items. The components are positive affect (e.g., “interested” and
“excited”) and negative affect (e.g., “distressed” and “upset”). Both components have good
internal consistency (positive, α = .88; negative, α = .87; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and
test-retest reliability (positive, r = .68; negative r = .71; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The
PANAS component scores are calculated by summing all items on each component. Higher
scores are indicative of more positive or negative affect, respectively. In the present sample, the
PANAS negative affect component showed good to excellent internal reliability (PANAS
negative affect α = .899).

Validity Questions

Validity questions will be included to ensure that participants are reading and providing
thoughtful answers for all questions. These questions are “please select ‘agree’ if you are paying
attention right now” and “I sometimes have fatal heart attacks while watching television”.
Validity questions are scored correct or incorrect. Any participants who respond incorrectly to
either question will be removed from analyses.
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Dimensional Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (DOCS; Abramowitz et al., 2010)

The DOCS is a commonly used measure of obsessive compulsive disorder symptoms and
consists of five items each about four categories of obsessive compulsive symptoms. (20 items
total) rated on a 5-point scale (0 to 4, responses vary by item). The four categories of symptoms
are concerns about germs and contamination (e.g., “about how much time have you spent each
day thinking about the possibility of harm or disasters and engaging in checking or efforts to get
reassurance that such things do not (or did not) occur?”); concerns about being responsible for
harm, injury, or bad luck (e.g., “to what extent have you avoided situations so that you did not
have to check for danger or worry about possible harm or disasters?”); unacceptable thoughts
(e.g., “when unwanted or unpleasant thoughts come to mind against your will how distressed or
anxious did you become?”); and concerns about symmetry, completeness, and the need for
things to be “just right” (e.g., “to what extent has your daily routine (work, school, self-care,
social life) been disrupted by the feeling of things being “not just right,” and efforts to put things
in order or make them feel right?” and “how difficult is it for you to disregard thoughts about the
lack of symmetry and order, and refrain from urges to arrange things in order or repeat certain
behaviors when you try to do so?”). The DOCS scales have good to excellent internal
consistency and adequate test-retest reliability (Abramowitz et al., 2010). The DOCS total and
component scores are calculated by summing all responses. Higher scores reflect higher levels
of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. In the present sample, the DOCS showed excellent internal
reliability (α = .913).
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Interoceptive Challenge

Participants were asked to complete an interoceptive challenge in order to assess how
they respond to interoceptive arousal. In order to invoke anxiety-related bodily sensations that
simulate a PA, researchers and clinicians alike have worked to develop realistic interoceptive
challenges. One of the most popular and effective is hyperventilation, or overbreathing.
Hyperventilation induces bodily sensations that naturally occur during a PA (Clark, 1986). It is
important to note that overbreathing exercises do not always induce panic, only the sensations.
A PA only occurs in the context of this exercise if the resulting bodily sensations are perceived
to be unpleasant and the individual interprets these sensations catastrophically (Clark, 1986).
For the study, the interoceptive challenge was an overbreathing exercise. Participants were
instructed how to overbreathe (“breathe in as deeply as you can until you fill your lungs with air
and then breathe out and completely empty your lungs of air… as if you are blowing up a large
balloon as quickly as you can”) and asked to inhale and exhale every time they heard a voice on
an audio recording say “in” and “out” for a series of three one-minute trials with a 15-second
break between each trial.

Procedure

A brief description of the present study was posted on the SONA website. Prior to
beginning the study, all participants were provided with a brief description of the study and a
consent form. No participants refused to provide consent. After providing consent, they were
asked to complete the ASI-3, DTS, IUS, AFQ-Y, DIS, ITES, ITPAS, ITSTS, and PANAS in a
fixed order. Then participants were asked to complete three overbreathing trials and provide a
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SUDS rating following each trial. After the last trial, participants were asked to complete the
HVC. Once finished, participants were presented with a debriefing form.

40

CHAPTER 3
MISSING DATA AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSES

Missing Data
The settings in the computerized survey required participants are required to answer
every question, though they may have choosen “prefer not to say” for any item, in order to
minimize missing data. There was a minimal amount of missing data (less than .001%). Any
missing data were handled using mean substitution (Sijtsma & van der Ark, 2003) because
missing data was exclusively in the context of one item per scale.

Preliminary Analyses

Ninety-one individuals completed the present study; seven participants incorrectly
responded to one or both of the validity questions, and the data of two participants were
invalidated due to experimenter error. The skewness and kurtosis of each scale was examined,
and all values were less than the absolute value of two. No scales appeared to violate
assumptions of normality, so no transformations were calculated. There were few outliers (four
cases, each with one scale score that was greater than three standard deviations from the mean).
When conducting the analyses without these four outlier cases, the results were the same, so they
were retained. The Variable Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance statistics were acceptable (i.e.,
no VIF values were less than .20, no Tolerance values were greater than 5). All means, standard
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deviations, and Cronbach’s alphas are presented in Table 1, along with the zero-order
correlations among all variables.

Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, Cronbach’s Alphas, and Zero-Order Correlations of All Scales
Construct
1. ITES
2. ITPAS
3. ITSTS

1
(.775)
.372*
.518*

2

3

4

5

(.831)
.644*

(.696)

4. ASI-3p
5. ASI-3c
6. ASI-3s
7. DTS
8. IUS
9. AFQ-Y
10. DIS

-.124*
-.097*
-.162*
.186+
-.178*
-.194+
-.297*

-.302*
-.055*
-.219+
.178*
-.109*
-.256*
-.323*

-.311* (.775)
-.130* .467* (.848)
-.218+ .451* .340* (.618)
.199+ -.317* -.303* -.394* (.939)
-.132* .385* .450* .568* -.487*
-.182* .507* .487* .666* -.494*
-.039* .210* .074* .189* -.210+
*

6

7

8

9

10

11

(.956)
.776*
.303*

(.912)
.299*

(.650)

+

.230*

.153

(.941)

12

11. SUDS

-.003* -.112*

.008*

.226

.205*

.074* -.333*

.205

12. DOCS

-.087*

.030*

.338*

.499*

.325* -.279*

.361*

.429*

.163*

.267*

(.913)

13. PANASna

-.189+ -.133* -.134*

.297*

.313*

.430* -.465*

.495*

.552*

.174*

.278*

.441*

.137*

13

(.899)

M
3.59
3.08
3.24
8.80
8.61 13.76
3.36 58.60 38.40 16.17
3.66
7.40 21.05
SD
0.91
1.03
0.81
2.75
3.63
5.05
0.91 20.97 13.55
6.24
2.91
2.31
8.13
Note. N = 79 - 82. Cronbach’s alphas are presented in the diagonal. *p < .05, +p < .10. ITES: Implicit Theories of Emotion
Scale, ITPAS: Implicit Theories of Physiological Arousal Scale, ITSTS: Implicit Theories of Sensation Transience Scale,
ASI-3p: Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 physical concerns, ASI-3c: Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 cognitive concerns, ASI-3s:
Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 social concerns, DTS: Distress Tolerance Scale, ITS: Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, AFQ-Y:
Acceptance and Fusion Questionnaire-Youth, DIS: Discomfort Intolerance Scale, SUDS: Subjective Units of Distress Scale,
PANASna: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule negative affect.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS

Negative affect is often considered a covariate of the constructs in the present study (e.g.,
Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998). It was controlled for in all analyses by entering it in Step 2
of the multiple regressions that were used to test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.

Hypothesis 1

To test whether AS and related constructs predict panic symptoms (Hypothesis 1), AS
and related variables (ASI-3 physical concerns, ASI-3 cognitive concerns, ASI-3 social concerns,
DTS, IUS, AFQ-Y, and DIS) were entered into Step 1 of a multiple regression with SUDS as the
dependent variable. The Step 1 variables accounted for a significant portion of the variance in
SUDS (see Table 2). To control for negative affect, it was entered in Step 2. Using multiple
regression analyses, the beta weight (β) associated with each predictor provided a test of that
construct’s incremental validity. DTS was the only unique predictor of SUDS in both steps of
the regression (see Table 2).
A follow-up analysis was conducted to clarify whether there was significant variance in
SUDS accounted for by common variance among AS and related variables. In this analysis,
DTS, the only significant singular predictor of SUDS in the above analysis, was entered in Step
1. AS and related variables were entered in Step 2. As a group, AS and related variables did not
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Table 2
Hypothesis 1: Anxiety Sensitivity and Related Constructs Predicting SUDS

Scale

B

SE(B)

β

ΔR2
.171+

Step 1
ASI-3p

.150

.140

.143

ASI-3c

.082

.105

.104

ASI-3s

-.090

.085

-.159

DTS

-1.004

.410

-.315*

IUS

-.021

.026

-.145

AFQ-Y

.031

.041

.145

DIS

.039

.053

.083
.032+

Step 2
ASI-3p

.158

.138

.150

ASI-3c

.082

.104

.103

ASI-3s

-.095

.084

-.166

DTS

-.852

.414

-.267*

IUS

-.029

.027

-.204

AFQ-Y

.019

.041

.089

DIS

.041

.053

.089

PANASna

.082

.048

.228+

Note: N = 82. *p < .05, +p < .10. SUDS: Subjective Unit of Distress Scale, ASI-3p: Anxiety
Sensitivity Index-3 physical concerns, ASI-3c: Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 cognitive concerns,
ASI-3s: Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 social concerns, DTS: Distress Tolerance Scale, ITS:
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, AFQ-Y: Acceptance and Fusion Questionnaire-Youth, DIS:
Discomfort Intolerance Scale, SUDS: Subjective Units of Distress Scale, PANASna: Positive
and Negative Affect Schedule negative affect.
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significantly predict SUDS when accounting for DTS (∆R2 = .056, p = .564). Thus, only DTS
accounted for significant variance in SUDS after controlling for other AS and related variables.
To establish specificity, it was hypothesized that the constructs that uniquely predicted
SUDS would not also uniquely predict DOCS. ASI-3 cognitive concerns was the only unique
predictor of DOCS total scores in both steps of the regression (see Table 3).
A follow-up analysis was conducted to clarify whether there was significant variance in
DOCS accounted for by common variance among the other AS and related variables (ie., all AS
and related variables other than ASI-3 cognitive concerns). In this analysis, ASI-3 cognitive
concerns, the only significant singular predictor of DOCS in the above analysis, was entered in
Step 1. The other AS and related variables were entered in Step 2. As a group, the other AS and
related variables did not significantly predict DOCS when accounting for ASI-3 cognitive
concerns (∆R2 = .056, p = .455). Thus, only ASI-3 cognitive concerns accounted for significant
variance in DOCS after controlling for the other AS and related variables.

Hypothesis 2

To test whether the implicit theories constructs predict AS and related constructs
(Hypothesis 2), seven multiple regressions were calculated with the implicit theories variables
(ITES, ITPAS, or ITSTS) entered as the independent variables in Step 1 and AS and related
constructs (ASI-3 physical concerns, ASI-3 cognitive concerns, ASI-3 social concerns, DTS,
IUS, AFQ-Y, and DIS) as the dependent variables. To control for negative affect, it was entered
into Step 2. Using multiple regression analyses, the beta weight (β) associated with each
predictor provided a test of that construct’s incremental validity. The implicit theories variables
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Table 3
Hypothesis 1: Anxiety Sensitivity and Related Constructs Predicting DOCS

Construct

B

SE(B)

β

Step 1

ΔR2
.300*

ASI-3p

.025

.102

.030

ASI-3c

.224

.077

.354*

ASI-3s

.012

.063

.026

DTS

-.061

.301

-.024

IUS

.010

.019

.092

AFQ-Y

.021

.030

.125

DIS

.019

.039

.052

Step 2

.042*

ASI-3p

.032

.100

.038

ASI-3c

.223

.075

.353*

ASI-3s

.008

.061

.017

DTS

.077

.301

.030

IUS

.003

.019

.025

AFQ-Y

.010

.030

.061

DIS

.021

.038

.058

PANASna

.075

.035

.260*

Note: N = 82. *p < .05, +p < .10. DOCS: Dimensional Obsessive Compulsive Scale, ASI-3p:
Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 physical concerns, ASI-3c: Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 cognitive
concerns, ASI-3s: Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 social concerns, DTS: Distress Tolerance Scale,
ITS: Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, AFQ-Y: Acceptance and Fusion Questionnaire-Youth,
DIS: Discomfort Intolerance Scale, SUDS: Subjective Units of Distress Scale, PANASna:
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule negative affect.
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did not account for significant variance in six of the seven AS and related variables in either step
of the regression (ASI-3 physical concerns, ASI-3 cognitive concerns, ASI-3 social concerns,
DTS, IUS, and AFQ-Y; see Tables 4 – 9). Each of the three implicit theories variables (ITES,
ITPAS, and ITSTS) did account for significant variance in DIS in both steps of the regression
(see Table 10). The relationships between ITES and DIS and between ITPAS and DIS were in
the predicted direction, but the relationship between ITSTS and DIS was not.

Hypothesis 3

To test whether the implicit theories constructs predict panic symptoms (Hypothesis 3),
one multiple regression was calculated with the implicit theories (ITES, ITPAS, and ITSTS)
entered in Step 1 as predictors and SUDS entered as the dependent variable. Using multiple
regression analyses, the beta weight (β) associated with each predictor provided a test of that
construct’s incremental validity. No implicit theory constructs (as a group and individually when
controlling for each other) uniquely predicted state anxiety (all ps > .05; see Table 11) or DOCS
(all ps > .05; see Table 12).
To control for negative affect, it was entered in Step 2. No implicit theory constructs
uniquely predicted state anxiety when controlling for negative affect (all ps > .05; see Table 11).
To establish specificity, it was hypothesized that the constructs that uniquely predicted
SUDS would not also uniquely predict DOCS. No implicit theory constructs (as a group and
individually when controlling for each other) uniquely predicted DOCS (all ps > .05; see Table
12). ITPAS uniquely predicted DOCS scores when controlling for negative affect such that an
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Table 4
Hypothesis 2: Implicit Constructs Predicting Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 Physical Concerns

Construct

B

SE(B)

β

Step 1
ITES

.112*
.371

.402

.122

ITPAS

-.549

.398

-.201

ITSTS

-.795

.548

-.224

Step 2
ITES

.050*
.337

.394

.111

ITPAS

-.536

.379

-.196

ITSTS

-.597

.544

-.168

.083

.040

PANASna

ΔR2

.231*

Note: N = 82. *p < .05, +p < .10. ITES: Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale, ITPAS: Implicit
Theories of Physiological Arousal Scale, ITSTS: Implicit Theories of Sensation Transience
Scale, PANASna: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule negative affect.
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Table 5
Hypothesis 2: Implicit Constructs Predicting Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 Cognitive Concerns

Construct

B

SE(B)

β

Step 1
ITES

.026
-.073

.576

-.017

ITPAS

.223

.555

.060

ITSTS

-.888

.785

-.183

Step 2
ITES

.090*
-.135

.553

-.032

ITPAS

.248

.532

.066

ITSTS

-.526

.764

-.108

.151

.056

PANASna

ΔR2

.309*

Note: N = 82. *p < .05, +p < .10. ITES: Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale, ITPAS: Implicit
Theories of Physiological Arousal Scale, ITSTS: Implicit Theories of Sensation Transience
Scale, PANASna: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule negative affect.
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Table 6
Hypothesis 2: Implicit Constructs Predicting Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 Social Concerns

Construct

B

SE(B)

β

Step 1
ITES

.047
.100

.752

.018

ITPAS

-.556

.725

-.112

ITSTS

-.882

1.025

-.137

Step 2

.171*

ITES

-.012

.687

-.002

ITPAS

-.510

.661

-.103

ITSTS

-.223

.950

-.035

.275

.070

PANASna

ΔR2

.425*

Note: N = 82. *p < .05, +p < .10. ITES: Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale, ITPAS: Implicit
Theories of Physiological Arousal Scale, ITSTS: Implicit Theories of Sensation Transience
Scale, PANASna: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule negative affect.
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Table 7
Hypothesis 2: Implicit Constructs Predicting Distress Tolerance Scale

Construct

B

SE(B)

β

Step 1

ΔR2
.038

ITES

.076

.134

.078

ITPAS

.071

.129

.081

ITSTS

.090

.182

.080

Step 2

.260*

ITES

.100

.115

.103

ITPAS

.061

.111

.070

ITSTS

-.053

.159

-.047

PANASna

-.060

.012

-.524*

Note: N = 82. *p < .05, +p < .10. ITES: Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale, ITPAS: Implicit
Theories of Physiological Arousal Scale, ITSTS: Implicit Theories of Sensation Transience
Scale, PANASna: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule negative affect.
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Table 8
Hypothesis 2: Implicit Constructs Predicting Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale

Construct

B

SE(B)

β

Step 1

ΔR2
.018

ITES

-1.722

3.178

-.075

ITPAS

-1.569

3.062

-.076

ITSTS

-.264

4.329

-.010

Step 2

.356*

ITES

-2.399

2.558

-.105

ITPAS

-1.297

2.463

-.063

ITSTS

3.690

3.537

.138

PANASna

1.653

.260

.613*

Note: N = 82. *p < .05, +p < .10. ITES: Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale, ITPAS: Implicit
Theories of Physiological Arousal Scale, ITSTS: Implicit Theories of Sensation Transience
Scale, PANASna: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule negative affect.
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Table 9
Hypothesis 2: Implicit Constructs Predicting Acceptance and Fusion Questionnaire-Youth

Construct

B

SE(B)

β

Step 1
ITES

.063
-.341

2.059

-.022

ITPAS

-3.294

1.983

-.242

ITSTS

.033

2.804

.022

Step 2
ITES

ΔR2

.326*
-.771

1.676

-.051

ITPAS

-3.122

1.614

-.229+

ITSTS

2.541

2.318

.144

PANASna

1.048

.171

.587*

Note: N = 82. *p < .05, +p < .10. ITES: Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale, ITPAS: Implicit
Theories of Physiological Arousal Scale, ITSTS: Implicit Theories of Sensation Transience
Scale, PANASna: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule negative affect.
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Table 10
Hypothesis 2: Implicit Constructs Predicting Discomfort Intolerance Scale

Construct

B

SE(B)

β

Step 1

.199*

ITES

-2.170

.875

-.311*

ITPAS

-2.630

.843

-.420*

ITSTS

2.883

1.192

.354*

Step 2

.021

ITES

-2.220

.870

-.318*

ITPAS

-2.610

.837

-.416*

ITSTS

3.178

1.203

.391*

.123

.089

.150

PANASna

ΔR2

Note: N = 82. *p < .05, +p < .10. ITES: Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale, ITPAS: Implicit
Theories of Physiological Arousal Scale, ITSTS: Implicit Theories of Sensation Transience
Scale, PANASna: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule negative affect.
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Table 11
Hypothesis 3: Implicit Constructs Predicting SUDS

Construct

B

SE(B)

β

Step 1
ITES

.023
.223

.439

.070

ITPAS

-.491

.423

-.173

ITSTS

.068

.598

.018

Step 2
ITES

ΔR2

.085*
.177

.423

.056

ITPAS

-.473

.407

-.166

ITSTS

.335

.584

.091

PANASna

.112

.043

.300*

Note: N = 82. *p < .05, +p < .10. SUDS: Subjective Units of Distress Scale, ITES: Implicit
Theories of Emotion Scale, ITPAS: Implicit Theories of Physiological Arousal Scale, ITSTS:
Implicit Theories of Sensation Transience Scale, PANASna: Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule negative affect.
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Table 12
Hypothesis 3: Implicit Constructs Predicting DOCS

Construct

B

SE(B)

β

Step 1
ITES

.025
-.128

.360

-.049

ITPAS

.449

.347

.192

ITSTS

-.398

.491

-.131

Step 2
ITES

.225*
-.189

.318

-.073

ITPAS

.474

.306

.202

ITSTS

-.040

.440

-.013

.149

.032

PANASna

ΔR2

.488*

Note: N = 82. *p < .05, +p < .10. DOCS: Dimensional Obsessive Compulsive Scale, ITES:
Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale, ITPAS: Implicit Theories of Physiological Arousal Scale,
ITSTS: Implicit Theories of Sensation Transience Scale, PANASna: Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule negative affect.
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incremental theory of physiological arousal was associated with increased DOCS scores (see
Table 12).

Hypothesis 4

To test whether AS and related constructs mediate the relationship between the implicit
theories constructs (Hypothesis 4), up to 21 regressions could have been tested by entering the
independent variable (ITES, ITPAS, or ITSTS) in Step 1 and the mediator (ASI-3 physical
concerns, ASI-3 cognitive concerns, ASI-3 social concerns, DTS, IUS, AFQ-Y, or DIS) in Step
2. For each regression, the dependent variable would have been state anxiety (SUDS).
Following Baron and Kenny’s (1986) requirements for a mediation analysis, no independent
variable (implicit theory variable) uniquely predicted the dependent variable (SUDS), so no
mediation analysis may be conducted. In addition, Preacher and Hayes’s (2004) requirements
were not met. According to Preacher and Hayes (2004), the independent variable and the
dependent variable must be significantly related to the mediator in order to conduct a mediation
analysis. Because there was no mediator that was uniquely related to an independent variable
and a dependent variable, the prerequisite conditions for conducting analyses of mediation were
not met. Therefore, no regressions were conducted. See Figure 2 for a summary of the results.
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Figure 2. Tested model controlling for negative affect. Residuals, correlations among residuals,
and correlations among exogenous variables not shown. Statistically significant (p < .05)
pathways are bolded; nonsignificant pathways are gray.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to examine whether these implicit theories (implicit
theories of emotion, implicit theories of physiological arousal, implicit theories of sensation
transience) constructs predict panic symptoms and whether their influence was mediated by AS
and related constructs (distress tolerance, intolerance of uncertainty, experiential avoidance, and
discomfort intolerance). No research had yet examined implicit theories of physiological arousal
or implicit theories of sensation transience, nor had research examined the relationships between
AS, related constructs, and negative affect. Although a number of significant correlations were
found between these variables, the hypotheses were unsupported.
Multiple significant correlational relationships were found among the implicit theories
variables, AS and related constructs, and panic symptoms. AS and related constructs did not
show robust relationships with panic symptoms. Implicit theories of emotion and implicit
theories of physiological arousal uniquely predicted discomfort intolerance; no implicit theory
variables uniquely predicted AS or the other related constructs. No implicit theories variables
uniquely predicted panic symptoms. Because no one mediator was uniquely related to an
implicit theory construct and panic symptoms, no mediation analyses could be calculated.
Following Baron and Kenny (1986), the first requirement for a mediation analysis is that
the mediator predicts the dependent variable. Distress tolerance uniquely predicted obsessivecompulsive symptoms. That association could not be attributed to negative affect. Individuals
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with higher levels of distress tolerance reported experiencing less anxiety during the
interoceptive challenge. Although no research had yet conducted similar analyses, these findings
were unexpected, particularly because of the strength of the relationship between AS and SUDS
following an interoceptive challenge in the literature (e.g., Eser et al., 2005; Schmidt et al.,
1997).
Distress tolerance was the only variable hypothesized to be a mediator that uniquely
predicted panic symptoms. Because other putative mediator variables had significant zero order
correlations with panic symptoms, further analyses were conducted to determine if the predictive
power of distress tolerance was unique from that of the other AS and related variables. When
controlling for distress tolerance, none of the other potential mediators individually or as a group
also uniquely predicted panic symptoms. This pattern of results suggested that distress tolerance
alone accounts for distinct variance.
Little previous research had examined the association between distress tolerance and
response to a hyperventilation challenge. The only study to do so predicted distress tolerance
with AS, negative affect, discomfort intolerance, and the experience of a panic attack during a
previous hyperventilation challenge (Marshall et al., 2008). Distress tolerance was not examined
as a predictor of response to the challenge (Marshall et al., 2008). Only the experience of a panic
attack during a previous hyperventilation challenge uniquely predicted distress tolerance
(operationalized as persistence on a hyperventilation challenge, not using the DTS) when
controlling for AS, negative affect, and discomfort intolerance (Marshall et al., 2008). Because
SUDS were not reported and because perseverance (i.e., distress tolerance) was an outcome (not
a predictor operationalized differently than in the present study), it was difficult to fully compare
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the results from Marshall and colleagues’ (2008) study and the present study. In both studies,
although operationalized differently, distress tolerance was associated with response to a
hyperventilation challenge when AS, negative affect, and discomfort intolerance were included
in the analyses. In the context of this study by Marshall and colleagues (2008), it was not
surprising that discomfort intolerance did not uniquely predict response to a challenge.
No previous research had examined intolerance of uncertainty, experiential avoidance, or
discomfort intolerance in response to a hyperventilation challenge. Although there were
relationships between intolerance of uncertainty, experiential avoidance, or discomfort
intolerance and anxiety sensitivity and panic, the lack of research in response to a
hyperventilation challenge may have explained the nonsignificant results in the present study. It
was possible that there was no previous research because the research had not yet been
conducted or because the research yielded no significant findings. If the latter reason is true, the
null results were to be expected. Due to the limited research examining distress tolerance and
related constructs in response to a hyperventilation challenge, more research is necessary to
determine if distress tolerance is a better predictor of response to an interoceptive challenge than
AS.
The second requirement for a mediation analysis was that the independent variable
predicts the mediator. Each of the three implicit theories variables uniquely predicted discomfort
intolerance. This association could not be attributed to negative affect. Individuals who reported
less of an incremental theory of emotion and of physiological arousal also reported higher levels
of discomfort intolerance than those with an incremental view, and those who reported more of
an incremental theory of sensation transience also reported higher levels of discomfort
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intolerance. Although the associations between discomfort intolerance and implicit theories of
emotion and of physiological arousal were in the expected direction, the relationship between
discomfort intolerance and the implicit theory of sensation transience were not. This relationship
could be explained by considering avoidance. By removing oneself from situations that cause
anxiety-related physiological arousal, one’s sensations decrease (i.e., change) rapidly, thus
supporting an incremental theory of sensation transience. It should also be noted that the zeroorder correlation between ITSTS and DIS is not significant and that the relationship is not in the
predicted direction, suggesting that this finding may be due to statistical suppression.
The third requirement for a mediation analysis was that the independent variable predicts
the dependent variable. When controlling for negative affect and when calculating the analysis
without negative affect, none of the implicit theories variables uniquely predicted panic
symptoms. Because most of the relationships between the implicit theories variables and the
other variables were in the expected direction (a less incremental view was associated with more
maladaptive scores on the other variables), it was possible that there was not enough variable
responding among participants for significant relationships to be observed. Although not
hypothesized, the lack of significant findings may have been due to the lesser predictive power
of implicit theories variables compared to other, nonimplicit theory variables. In the present
study, the correlations between the implicit theories variables and panic symptoms (range of
magnitude of r = .003 - .112) were smaller than the correlations between AS and related
constructs and panic symptoms (range of magnitude of r = .074 - .333). This magnitude of
correlations of implicit theory variables with outcomes had also been reported by other
researchers. For example, the ITES was only moderately correlated, if at all, to emotion
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regulation variables (self-efficacy r = .24, p < .05; reappraisal r = .35, p < .05; suppression r =
.04, p = ns; Tamir et al., 2007). These findings suggested that the implicit theories variables may
be more valuable when examined as moderators of panic-related outcomes or with a different
outcome variable (see below for further discussion).
Had all of the aforementioned requirements been met (Hypotheses 1 – 3), a mediation
analysis would have been conducted. However, because no one mediation variable was uniquely
related to an independent variable and the dependent variable, mediation analyses were not
appropriate (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Preacher & Hayes, 2004).
It was also hypothesized that these expected results would not be found for obsessive
compulsive symptoms. AS cognitive concerns uniquely predicted obsessive-compulsive
symptoms. That association could not be attributed to negative affect. Individuals with who
reported more AS cognitive concerns also reported more obsessive compulsive symptoms. This
was not unexpected given the higher levels of AS in clinical populations with obsessive
compulsive disorder (Taylor et al., 2007). When conducting the analysis without negative affect,
none of the implicit theory variables significantly predicted obsessive compulsive symptoms.
When controlling for negative affect, implicit theories of physiological arousal accounted for
unique variance in obsessive compulsive symptoms. Individuals with an incremental view of
physiological arousal reported more obsessive compulsive symptoms than those with an entity
view but only when the variance associated with negative affect has been statistically accounted
for in the analysis. This finding may be explained by the nature of obsessive compulsive
symptoms. By engaging in a compulsive behavior, one’s anxiety and accompanying
physiological arousal decrease, supporting the incremental theory that physiological arousal can
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be changed or controlled. Once again, a mediation analysis could not be examined because no
one mediation variable was uniquely related to an independent variable and the dependent
variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Preacher & Hayes, 2004). However, the DOCS may not have
been an adequate parallel to the SUDS because the DOCS measures symptoms whereas the
SUDS measures affect.
One interpretation of the nonsignificant findings is that the theoretical model was not
supported because the theory is incorrect. The substantial limitations of the present study
obscure the cause of the null findings and prevent a conclusion from being made about the
validity of the theory. As is discussed below, the hypotheses may not have been supported
because of colinearity, a small sample size, the way the data was collected, the choice of
outcome variable or measure, the similar operationalization of the constructs (i.e., similar items
on different scales), or a number of other limitations. Also, the hypotheses may not have been
supported because the implicit theories variables may not be associated with the hypothesized
outcome. Additionally, they may be differently associated with AS and related variables or with
panic symptoms than was hypothesized. The present findings, both significant and
nonsignificant, were not sufficient to determine the validity of the theoretical model. Further
research and consideration is needed to explore the nature of these relationships (see below).
A possible reason why the hypotheses were not supported was the high zero-order
correlations. High colinearity suggested that measures of AS and related variables may have
been measuring the same higher order construct. The strong relationships between variables
were particularly concerning for the correlation between negative affect and the other variables.
Most of the putative mediator variables and the panic symptoms variable were significantly
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correlated with negative affect. The variance accounted for by negative affect was controlled for
in the analyses because of its purported role as a covariate. However, negative affect may
instead be a higher order factor that includes AS and related variables, making these variables a
set of less parsimonious predictors. Thus, negative affect may not be distinct from these
variables, and it may have been unnecessary to control for it in the analyses. Controlling for AS
and related variables likely accounted for the variance due to the common general factor
underlying many psychopathology measures.
Although the VIF and Tolerance statistics were acceptable, there was still concern about
the similarity between scales. Various items on different scales appeared to overlap to a
problematic extent. For example, the items “I can’t stand to feel pain or hurt in my body” (from
the AFQ-Y) and “I can tolerate a great deal of physical discomfort” (from the DIS) appear
extremely similar. The item “if my heart beats fast, there must be something wrong with me”
(from the AFQ-Y) is strikingly similar to the two items “it scares me when my heart beats
rapidly” and “when I notice my heart skipping a beat, I worry that there is something seriously
wrong with me” (from the ASI-3 physical concerns scale).
This overlap may have occurred because the constructs themselves are similar or because
the constructs were operationalized similarly. If the shared items were due to similar
conceptualization of the constructs, concerns are raised about the distinction between constructs.
Although the present study was unable to do so due to limited sample size, an exploratory factor
analysis could be conducted to examine this overlap. An exploratory factor analysis would be
atheoretical, which could be useful for clarifying constructs. Although there was some overlap
between items, and possibly between constructs, it is not necessary to revisit the development of
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these constructs. A confirmatory factor analysis using the existing construct operationalization
(i.e., scale construction) could be conducted, leading to theoretically-driven modifications to the
scales. This approach would combine theoretical understanding with empirical research and
further distinguish these constructs. The present analyses were unable to identify which of these
similar constructs is the most useful when predicting state anxiety in response to a
hyperventilation challenge (i.e., the proxy for panic symptoms) and in the context of implicit
theories constructs. Further clarification of the operationalization of these constructs could allow
future research to determine the most relevant construct in a design such as that used in the
present study. However, a number of practical concerns would need to be addressed before
conducting either analysis, such as inconsistent rating scales between scales, balancing content,
and redundancy of items.
As was briefly referenced above, the sample size for the present study was limited and
could have prevented actual relationships among variables from being statistically significant.
Fritz and MacKinnon (2007) suggest a full mediation could have only been found if there was a
large effect of an implicit theory variable on an AS or related construct and a large effect of an
AS or related construct on panic symptoms (for .8 power) when using the Baron and Kenny
(1986) approach. When not controlling for negative affect or related variables (i.e., the other
implicit theories variables or the other AS and related constructs variables), the smallest sample
size needed for a partial mediation (assuming small effect sizes) would be at least 530
participants. However, when using the bivariate correlations to inform potential effect sizes, the
smallest sample needed for a partial mediation (e.g., ISTS and DTS, DTS and SUDS) with a
medium and a large effect size would be approximately 53 – 88 participants. Although the
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present sample size is within this range, the guidelines published by Fritz and MacKinnon (2007)
are general and do not account for the added requirement that the variables be uniquely
responsible for variance when controlling for other, related variables. It is possible that this
method of identifying unique predictor and mediator variables prevented a statistically
significant mediation analysis from being conducted.
There are a number of other limitations of this research. All data collected from this
sample relied upon a number of self-report measures, which may have fatigued participants. It
was also collected during the last two weeks of the Spring semester. Many students participate
in multiple studies within a short time period at the end of the semester, which may have
increased fatigue. The questionnaires were also presented in a fixed order, meaning that there
could be more fatigued responding on later measures than on earlier ones.
Another limitation is that there may be a better outcome, either the construct or its
measurement. State anxiety, a proxy of panic symptoms, appeared to be appropriate for
exploring AS and related constructs. However, an objective, behavioral measure may have been
a better indicator of panic symptoms than self-reported state anxiety. The sample in this study
was comprised of undergraduate students with no history of a panic attack. It is possible that the
lack of panic psychopathology was responsible for the largely nonsignificant results. The
processes in this non-clinical, minimally symptomatic sample may not be representative of the
processes in populations with severe panic psychopathology, particularly individuals in treatment
for panic disorder.
The lack of significant relationships among state anxiety and the implicit theories
constructs suggests that another construct may have been a more appropriate outcome variable.
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Although entity and incremental theorists differ in their response to a challenge, such as the
interoceptive challenge in this study, outcomes such as persistence (e.g., a behavioral measure of
persistence in response to a challenge similar to Marshall et al., 2008), learning, and motivation
(e.g., Dweck, 1986) may have been more relevant to the implicit theories domain.

Future Directions

These results suggest a number of considerations for continued research. The implicit
theory variables did not directly or indirectly predict the panic symptoms variable. Future
research should consider examining implicit theory variables as potential moderators, such as
implicit theories of anxiety (Schroder, Dawood, Yalch, Donnellan, & Moser, 2014). For
example, an incremental theory may only be important for individuals with high scores on AS
and related variables. Another alternative is the selection of a different outcome variable that
may be more appropriate for the application of implicit theories (e.g., persistence).
Future research should also consider reexamining the operationalization of implicit
theories of sensation transience. When it was conceptualized, no distinction was made between
the fleetingness of the sensations and the controllability of the sensations. It is possible that there
is a meaningful difference between the two. A principal components analysis found that the
controllability items (items 2, 3, and 4) loaded onto a single factor, and the fleetingness item
(item 1) loaded onto its own factor. Because a single item cannot define a unique factor, further
research should consider focusing on controllability or develop more items to further explore
fleetingness. These post hoc results should be interpreted with extreme caution given the limited
number of items. It is not suggested that the ITSTS is a two-factor scale, only that further
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consideration is needed when considering fleetingness and controllability in this implicit theories
construct.
Except for the ASI-3, none of the component scales of measures was used. Future
research should consider examining the component scales individually. For example, the
appraisal scale of the DTS may uniquely predict variance in panic symptoms.
In addition, this design does not allow for a test of causality, as a true mediation model
would. Because the data for the present study was collected at a single timepoint, a test of
mediation would have limited the conclusions that could have been drawn. Because of the
theoretical distal relationships between the variables, a test of indirect effects may have been
better suited to examine the hypotheses. Future research should consider the distinctions
between a mediation analysis and a test of indirect effects to determine which is more
appropriate. By design, a mediation analysis requires that the implicit theories variable (the
independent variable) significantly predicts panic symptoms (the dependent variable). The very
low and nonsignificant correlations among the implicit theories variables and the SUDS suggest
that a mediation model may not be able to capture the true associations between these variables.
The implicit theories constructs may be farther removed from state anxiety in response to a
challenge (i.e., this study’s proxy for panic symptoms) than was originally anticipated.
Therefore, a test of indirect effects may be more appropriate. As previously mentioned, a
mediation model implies causation. The relationship between implicit theories constructs, AS
and related constructs, and SUDS may be reciprocal, such that learning that occurs during the
interoceptive challenge may reinforce or weaken previously held beliefs. If this is hypothesized,
a mediation model may be appropriate.
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Further research should also consider using a clinical population in order to translate
potential findings into the clinical context. However, considering the overlap among scale items
(and potentially between constructs), it may not be possible to manipulate one construct without
also manipulating other related constructs. AS and related variables have largely been found to
be interrelated, both in the literature and in the present study. However, these relationships are
unclear, and further research is needed to clarify and further understand the intricacies of these
relationships, particularly in the context of the implicit theories framework.
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A
ANXIETY SENSITIVITY INDEX – 3
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Please select the number that best corresponds to how much you agree with each item. If any
items concern something that you have never experienced (e.g., fainting in public) answer on the
basis of how you think you might feel if you had such an experience. Otherwise, answer all items
on the basis of your own experience. Be careful to select only one number for each item and
please answer all items.
Very

A

Very
Some Much

1. It is important for me not to appear nervous.

Little

little

much

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

2. When I cannot keep my mind on a task, I worry
that I might be going crazy.
3. It scares me when my heart beats rapidly.
4. When my stomach is upset, I worry that I might
be seriously ill.
5. It scares me when I am unable to keep my mind
on a task.
6. When I tremble in the presence of others, I fear
what people might think of me.
7. When my chest feels tight, I get scared that I
won’t be able to breathe properly.
8. When I feel pain in my chest, I worry that I’m
going to have a heart attack.
9. I worry that other people will notice my anxiety.
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10. When I feel “spacey” or spaced out I worry that I
0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3.

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

may be mentally ill.
11. It scares me when I blush in front of people.
12. When I notice my heart skipping a beat, I worry
that there is something seriously wrong with me.
13. When I begin to sweat in a social situation, I fear
people will think negatively of me.
14. When my thoughts seem to speed up, I worry that
I might be going crazy.
15. When my throat feels tight, I worry that I could
choke to death.
16. When I have trouble thinking clearly, I worry that
there is something wrong with me.
17. I think it would be horrible for me to faint in
public.
18. When my mind goes blank, I worry there is
something terribly wrong with me.

83

APPENDIX B
DISTRESS TOLERANCE SCALE
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Think of the times that you feel distressed or upset. Select the response that best describes your
beliefs about feeling distressed or upset.
Agree
Strongly

Mildly

Agree

Agree

and

Mildly

Strongly

Disagree Disagree Disagree
Equally

1. Feeling distressed or upset is
1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

unbearable to me.
2. When I feel distressed or upset, all I
can think about is how bad I feel.
3. I can’t handle feeling distressed or
upset.
4. My feelings of distress are so intense
that they completely take over.
5. There’s nothing worse than feeling
distressed or upset.
6. I can tolerate being distressed or
upset.
7. My feelings of distress or being
upset are not acceptable.
8. I’ll do anything to avoid feeling
distressed or upset.
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9. Other people seem to be able to
tolerate feeling distressed or upset

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

better than I can.
10. Being distressed or upset is always a
major ordeal for me.
11. I am ashamed of myself when I feel
distressed or upset.
12. My feelings of distress or being
upset scare me.
13. I’ll do anything to stop feeling
distressed or upset.
14. When I feel distressed or upset, I
must do something about it
immediately.
15. When I feel distressed or upset, I
cannot help but concentrate on how
bad the distress actually feels.
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APPENDIX C
INTOLERANCE OF UNCERTAINTY SCALE
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You will find below a series of statements which describe how people may react to the
uncertainties of life. Please use the scale below to describe to what extent each item is
characteristic of you. Please choose a number (1 to 5) that describes you best.
Not at all

Somewhat

characteristic of

Entirely

characteristic of

me

characteristic of

me

me

1. Uncertainty stops me from
1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

having a firm opinion.
2. Being uncertain means that a
person is disorganized.
3. Uncertainty makes like
intolerable.
4. It’s unfair not having any
guarantees in life.
5. My mind can’t be relaxed if I
don’t know what will happen
tomorrow.
6. Uncertainty makes me
uneasy, anxious, or stressed.
7. Unforseen events upset me
greatly.
8. It frustrates me not having all
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the information I need.
9. Uncertainty keeps me from
1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

living a full life.
10. One should always look
ahead so as to avoid
surprises.
11. A small unforeseen event can
spoil everything, even the
best planning.
12. When it’s time to act,
uncertainty paralyzes me.
13. Being uncertain means that I
am not first rate.
14. When I am uncertain, I can’t
go forward.
15. When I am uncertain, I can’t
function very well.
16. Unlike me, others always
seem to know where they are
going with their lives.
17. Uncertainty makes me
vulnerable, unhappy, or sad.
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18. I always want to know what
1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

the future has in store for me.
19. I can’t stand being taken by
surprise.
20. The smallest doubt can stop
me from acting.
21. I should be able to organize
everything in advance.
22. Being uncertain means I lack
confidence.
23. I think it’s unfair that other
people seem sure about their
future.
24. Uncertainty keeps me from
sleeping soundly.
25. I must get away from all
uncertain situations.
26. The ambiguities in life stress
me.
27. I can’t stand being undecided
about my future.
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APPENDIX D
AVOIDANCE AND FUSION QUESTIONNAIRE – YOUTH
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We want to know more about what you think, how you feel, and what you do. Read each
sentence. Then, choose the response that tells how true each sentence is for you.
Not at

A little

Pretty

Very

all True

True

True

1. My life won’t be good until I feel happy.

0

1

2

3

4

2. My thoughts and feelings mess up my life.

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

True
True

3. If I feel sad or afraid, something must be
wrong with me.
4. The bad things I think about myself must
be true.
5. I don’t try out new things if I’m afraid of
messing up.
6. I must get rid of my worries and fears so I
can have a good life.
7. I do all I can so I can make sure I don’t
look dumb in front of other people.
8. I try hard to erase hurtful memories from
my mind.
9. I can’t stand to feel pain or hurt in my
body.
10. If my heart beats fast, there must be
something wrong with me.
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11. I push away thoughts and feelings that I
0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

16. I am afraid of my feelings.

0

1

2

3

4

17. I can’t be a good friend when I feel upset.

0

1

2

3

4

don’t like.
12. I stop doing things that are important to
me whenever I feel bad.
13. I do worse in school when I have thoughts
that make me feel sad.
14. I say things to make me sound cool.
15. I wish I could wave a magic wand to make
all my sadness go away.
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APPENDIX E
DISCOMFORT INTOLERANCE SCALE
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not at all like

neither like me

extremely like

me

nor unlike me

me

1. I can tolerate a great deal of physical
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

discomfort.
2. I have a high pain threshold.
3. I take extreme measures to avoid
feeling physically uncomfortable.
4. When I begin to feel physically
uncomfortable, I quickly take steps
to relieve the discomfort.
5. I am more sensitive to feeling
discomfort compared to most
persons.

95

APPENDIX F
IMPLICIT THEORIES OF EMOTION SCALE
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Read each sentence below and then select the one number that shows how much you agree with
it. There are no right or wrong answers.
Strongly

Mostly

Mostly

Disagree

Agree

Disagree
Disagree

Strongly
Agree
Agree

1. Everyone can learn to
1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

control their emotions.
2. If they want to, people
can change the emotions
that they have.
3. No matter how hard they
try, people can’t really
change the emotions that
they have.
4. The truth is, people have
very little control over
their emotions.
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APPENDIX G
IMPLICIT THEORIES OF PHYSIOLOGICAL AROUSAL
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Sometimes when people are anxious, they feel physical sensations. Read each sentence below
and then select the one number that shows how much you agree with it. There are no right or
wrong answers.
Strongly

Mostly

Mostly

Disagree
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Disagree

Agree

Agree

1. Everyone can learn to
control their physical

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

sensations.
2. If they want to, people
can change the physical
sensations that they have.
3. No matter how hard they
try, people can’t really
change the physical
sensations that they have.
4. The truth is, people have
very little control over
their physical sensations.
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APPENDIX H
IMPLICIT THEORIES OF SENSATION TRANSIENCE SCALE
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Sometimes when people are anxious, they feel physical sensations. Read each sentence below
and then select the one number that shows how much you agree with it. There are no right or
wrong answers.
Strongly

Mostly

Mostly

Disagree
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Disagree

Agree

Agree

1. Everyone can learn that
their sensations are

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

fleeting.
2. If they want to, people
can change the duration
of their sensations.
3. No matter how hard they
try, people can’t really
change the duration of
their sensations that they
have.
4. The truth is, people have
very little control over
the duration of their
sensations.
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APPENDIX I
SUBJECTIVE UNITS OF DISCOMFORT SCALE
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Please indicate the amount of anxiety you are experiencing right now.
1. How would you rate your level of anxiety right now?
0

1

2

3

4

No
Anxiety

5

6

7

8

9

Moderate
Anxiety

10
Extremely
Intense
Anxiety

2. How would you rate your level of anxiety right now?
0

1

2

3

4

No
Anxiety

5

6

7

8

9

Moderate
Anxiety

10
Extremely
Intense
Anxiety

3. How would you rate your level of anxiety right now?
0
No
Anxiety

1

2

3

4

5
Moderate
Anxiety

6

7

8

9

10
Extremely
Intense
Anxiety
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APPENDIX J
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT SCHEDULE
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This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each
item and then choose the number from the scale below. Indicate to what extent you feel this way
in general, that is, on the average.
Very
Slightly or

A Little

Moderately

Quite a Bit

Extremely

Not at All
1. Interested

1

2

3

4

5

2. Distressed

1

2

3

4

5

3. Excited

1

2

3

4

5

4. Upset

1

2

3

4

5

5. Strong

1

2

3

4

5

6. Guilty

1

2

3

4

5

7. Scared

1

2

3

4

5

8. Hostile

1

2

3

4

5

9. Enthusiastic

1

2

3

4

5

10. Proud

1

2

3

4

5

11. Irritable

1

2

3

4

5

12. Alert

1

2

3

4

5

13. Ashamed

1

2

3

4

5

14. Inspired

1

2

3

4

5

15. Nervous

1

2

3

4

5
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16. Nervous

1

2

3

4

5

17. Attentive

1

2

3

4

5

18. Jittery

1

2

3

4

5

19. Active

1

2

3

4

5

20. Afraid

1

2

3

4

5
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APPENDIX K
VALIDITY QUESTIONS
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1. Please select 'agree' if you are paying attention right now.
2. I sometimes have fatal heart attacks while watching television.
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APPENDIX L
DIMENSIONAL OBSESSIVE COMUPULSIVE SCALE
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This questionnaire asks you about 4 different types of concerns that you might or might not
experience. For each type there is a description of the kinds of thoughts (sometimes called
obsessions) and behaviors (sometimes called rituals or compulsions) that are typical of that
particular concern, followed by 5 questions about your experiences with these thoughts and
behaviors. Please read each description carefully and answer the questions for each category
based on your experiences in the last month.

Category 1: Concerns about Germs and Contamination
Examples…
-Thoughts or feelings that you are contaminated because you came into contact with (or were
nearby) a certain object or person.
-The feeling of being contaminated because you were in a certain place (such as a bathroom).
-Thoughts about germs, sickness, or the possibility of spreading contamination.
-Washing your hands, using hand sanitizer gels, showering, changing your clothes, or cleaning
objects because of concerns about contamination.
-Following a certain routine (e.g., in the bathroom, getting dressed) because of contamination
-Avoiding certain people, objects, or places because of contamination.

The next questions ask about your experiences with thoughts and behaviors related to
contamination over the last month. Keep in mind that your experiences might be different than
the examples listed above. Please circle the number next to your answer:
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0

1

2

3

2

3

4

1. About how much time have
you spent each day thinking

1
0

about contamination and

4
Between 1

Between 3

and 3

and 8

hours each

hours each

day

day

Less than
None at

engaging in washing or

8 or more

1 hour
all

cleaning behaviors because of

hours each

each day

day

contamination?
2. To what extent have you
2
avoided situations in order to

4
3

0

1

A

prevent concerns with

Extreme
A great

None at

A little

moderate

contamination or having to

avoidance
deal of

all

avoidance

amount of

spend time washing, cleaning,

of nearly
avoidance

avoidance

all things

or showering?
3. If you had thoughts about
contamination but could not
0

1

2

3

4

Not at all

Mildly

Moderately

Severely

Extremely

distressed/

distressed/

distressed/

distressed/

distressed/

anxious

anxious

anxious

anxious

anxious

0

1

2

3

4

wash, clean, or shower (or
otherwise remove the
contamination), how
distressed or anxious did you
become?
4. To what extent has your
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daily routine (work, school,
self-care, social life) been
disrupted by contamination

No

A little

Many

My life is

My life is

disruption

disruption,

things are

disrupted

completely

at all

but mostly

disrupted,

in many

disrupted,

I function

but I can

ways, and

and I

well

still

I have

cannot

manage

trouble

function at

managing

all

concerns and excessive
washing, showering, cleaning,
or avoidance behaviors?

5. How difficult is it for you
to disregard thoughts about
contamination and refrain
0

1

2

3

4

Not at all

A little

Moderately

Very

Extremely

difficult

difficult

difficult

difficult

difficult

from behaviors such as
washing, showering, cleaning,
and other decontamination
routines when you try to do
so?

Category 2: Concerns about being Responsible for Harm, Injury, or Bad Luck
Examples…
-A doubt that you might have made a mistake that could cause something awful or harmful to
happen.
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-The thought that a terrible accident, disaster, injury, or other bad luck might have occurred and
you weren’t careful enough to prevent it.
-The thought that you could prevent harm or bad luck by doing things in a certain way, counting
to certain numbers, or by avoiding certain “bad” numbers or words.
-Thought of losing something important that you are unlikely to lose (e.g., wallet, identify theft,
papers).
-Checking things such as locks, switches, your wallet, etc. more often than is necessary.
-Repeatedly asking or checking for reassurance that something bad did not (or will not) happen.
-Mentally reviewing past events to make sure you didn’t do anything wrong.
-The need to follow a special routine because it will prevent harm or disasters from occurring.
-The need to count to certain numbers, or avoid certain bad numbers, due to the fear of harm.

The next questions ask about your experiences with thoughts and behaviors related to harm and
disasters over the last month. Keep in mind that your experiences might be slightly different
than the examples listed above. Please circle the number next to your answer:

0

1

1. About how much time

2

3

2

3

1
have you spent each day

0

4
Between 1

Between 3

and 3

and 8

hours each

hours each

day

day

Less than
thinking about the possibility

None at

8 or more

1 hour
of harm or disasters and

all

hours each

each day
engaging in checking or

4

day
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efforts to get reassurance that
such things do not (or did not)
occur?
2. To what extent have you

2

4
3

avoided situations so that you

0

1

A

Extreme
A great

did not have to check for

None at

A little

moderate

avoidance
deal of

danger or worry about

all

avoidance

amount of

of nearly
avoidance

possible harm or disasters?

avoidance

all things

3. When you think about the
possibility of harm or

0

1

2

3

4

disasters, or if you cannot

Not at all

Mildly

Moderately

Severely

Extremely

check or get reassurance about

distressed/

distressed/

distressed/

distressed/

distressed/

these things, how distressed or

anxious

anxious

anxious

anxious

anxious

3

4

My life is

My life is

disrupted

completely

in many

disrupted,

ways, and

and I

I have

cannot

trouble

function at

managing

all

anxious did you become?
4. To what extent has your
2
daily routine (work, school,

1
Many

self-care, social life) been

0

A little

No

disruption,

things are
disrupted by thoughts about

disrupted,
harm or disasters and

disruption

but mostly
but I can

excessive checking or asking

at all

I function
still

for reassurance?

well
manage
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5. How difficult is it for you
to disregard thoughts about
0

1

2

3

4

Not at all

A little

Moderately

Very

Extremely

difficult

difficult

difficult

difficult

difficult

possible harm or disasters and
refrain from checking or
reassurance-seeking behaviors
when you try to do so?

Category 3: Unacceptable Thoughts
Examples…
-Unpleasant thoughts about sex, immorality, or violence that come to mind against your will.
-Thoughts about doing awful, improper, or embarrassing things that you don’t really want to do.
-Repeating an action or following a special routine because of a bad thought.
-Mentally performing an action or saying prayers to get rid of an unwanted or unpleasant
thought.
-Avoidance of certain people, places, situations or other triggers of unwanted or unpleasant
thoughts

The next questions ask about your experiences with unwanted thoughts that come to mind
against your will and behaviors designed to deal with these kinds of thoughts over the last
month. Keep in mind that your experiences might be slightly different than the examples listed
above. Please circle the number next to your answer:
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0

1

1. About how much time

2

3

2

3

Between 1

Between 3

and 3

and 8

1
have you spent each day with

0

unwanted unpleasant thoughts

None at

4

Less than

8 or more

1 hour
and with behavioral or mental

all

hours each
hours each

hours each

each day
actions to deal with them?

4

day
day

day

2. To what extent have you
2
been avoiding situations,

4
3

0

1

A

None at

A little

moderate

places, objects and other

Extreme
A great

reminders (e.g., numbers,

avoidance
deal of

all

avoidance

amount of

people) that trigger unwanted

of nearly
avoidance

avoidance

all things

or unpleasant thoughts?
3. When unwanted or
0

1

2

3

4

Not at all

Mildly

Moderately

Severely

Extremely

distressed/

distressed/

distressed/

distressed/

distressed/

anxious

anxious

anxious

anxious

anxious

4. To what extent has your

0

1

2

3

4

daily routine (work, school,

No

A little

Many

My life is

My life is

self-care, social life) been

disruption

disruption,

things are

disrupted

completely

disrupted by unwanted and

at all

but mostly

disrupted,

in many

disrupted,

unpleasant thoughts come to
mind against your will how
distressed or anxious did you
become?
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unpleasant thoughts and
efforts to avoid or deal with

I function

but I can

ways, and

and I

well

still

I have

cannot

manage

trouble

function at

managing

all

such thoughts?

5. How difficult is it for you
to disregard unwanted or
0

1

2

3

4

Not at all

A little

Moderately

Very

Extremely

difficult

difficult

difficult

difficult

difficult

unpleasant thoughts and
refrain from using behavioral
or mental acts to deal with
them when you try to do so?

Category 4: Concerns about Symmetry, Completeness, and the Need for Things to be “Just
Right”
Examples…
-The need for symmetry, evenness, balance, or exactness.
-Feelings that something isn’t “just right.”
-Repeating a routine action until it feels “just right” or “balanced.”
-Counting senseless things (e.g., ceiling tiles, words in a sentence).
-Unnecessarily arranging things in “order.”
-Having to say something over and over in the same way until it feels “just right.”
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The next questions ask about your experiences with feelings that something is not “just right”
and behaviors designed to achieve order, symmetry, or balance over the last month. Keep in
mind that your experiences might be slightly different than the examples listed above. Please
circle the number next to your answer:

0

1

2

3

2

3

4

1. About how much time
have you spent each day with
1
unwanted thoughts about

0

4
Between 1

Between 3

and 3

and 8

hours each

hours each

day

day

Less than
symmetry, order, or balance

None at

8 or more

1 hour
and with behaviors intended to

all

hours each

each day
achieve symmetry, order or

day

balance?
2. To what extent have you
2
been avoiding situations,

4
3

0

1

A

places or objects associated

Extreme
A great

None at

A little

moderate

all

avoidance

amount of

with feelings that something is

avoidance
deal of

not symmetrical or “just

of nearly
avoidance

avoidance

all things

right?”
3. When you have the feeling

0

1

2

3

4

of something being “not just

Not at all

Mildly

Moderately

Severely

Extremely

right,” how distressed or

distressed/

distressed/

distressed/

distressed/

distressed/

118
anxious did you become?

anxious

anxious

anxious

4. To what extent has your

anxious

anxious

3

4

My life is

My life is

disrupted

completely

in many

disrupted,

ways, and

and I

I have

cannot

trouble

function at

managing

all

2
daily routine (work, school,

1
Many

self-care, social life) been

0

A little

disrupted by the feeling of

No

disruption,

things are
disrupted,
things being “not just right,”

disruption

but mostly
but I can

and efforts to put things in

at all

I function
still

order or make them feel right?

well
manage

5. How difficult is it for you
to disregard thoughts about
the lack of symmetry and

0

1

2

3

4

order, and refrain from urges

Not at all

A little

Moderately

Very

Extremely

to arrange things in order or

difficult

difficult

difficult

difficult

difficult

repeat certain behaviors when
you try to do so?

